

28
28 October 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Proposed Weekly Meeting of the
Intelligence Advisory Board

In the past, IAB meetings have been scheduled only when sufficient business has accumulated. Recently this procedure has resulted in an overloaded agenda, with resultant confusion and delayed action. Moreover, in the absence of a regularly scheduled meeting day, it has frequently been difficult to set an early date convenient to all members after a decision to hold the meeting has been made.

It is therefore recommended that Thursday afternoon at 1430 be set aside as the scheduled time for IAB meetings. In that way this time will be reserved by all members, and it will be easy to cancel the meeting when there is no business to transact. In addition, this will encourage more frequent meetings when necessary, each with a shorter agenda, resulting in a more positive and quicker action.

Thursday afternoon is suggested for the following reasons:

- a. It allows sufficient time to arrange and prepare for an NIA meeting the following Wednesday if required as a result of IAB action.
- b. It gives almost a full week to prepare for the IAB meeting.
- c. It allows Friday to take any action prior to the weekend required by IAB decisions.
- d. It eliminates the possibility that members may not be able to attend because of a long weekend beginning Friday.

Mr. Edgar concurs in the above recommendation.

"SIGNED"

James S. Lay, Jr.
Secretary, N.I.A.

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COPY NO. 7

I.A.G. 1st Meeting

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 5132
New War Department Building
on Monday, 4 February 1946, at 3:30 P.M.

Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Director
of Central Intelligence, in the Chair

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. Alfred McCormack, Special Assistant to
the Secretary of State in Charge of
Research and Intelligence
Brig. Gen. John Weckerling (representing
Lt. Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg, Assistant Chief
of Staff, G-2, WDGS)
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis,
Chief of Naval Intelligence
Brig. Gen. John A. Samford,
Acting Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence

ALSO PRESENT

Capt. Thomas F. Cullen, USNR
Capt. W. B. Goggins, USN
Mr. L. L. Montague, Department of State
Col. E. P. Mussatt, USA
Col. C. P. Nicholas, USA
Col. W. A. Perry, USA

SECRETARY

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Department of State

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1. PROPOSED POLICIES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

The paper was discussed paragraph by paragraph.

ADMIRAL INGLIS questioned whether paragraph 3, on the composition of the Intelligence Advisory Board, permitted other officials of the State, War and Navy Departments, such as the Director of Naval Communications, to participate in meetings of that Board. After discussion and amendment

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:-

- a. Concurred in the paper as amended at the meeting. (Subsequently circulated as N.I.A. 1.)
- b. Agreed that the wording of paragraph 3 does not preclude membership by heads of other intelligence agencies of the State, War and Navy Departments, but that each case will be decided on its merits by agreement between the Director of Central Intelligence and the permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

2. PROPOSED TENTATIVE ORGANIZATION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

The paper was discussed and amended.

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:-

Concurred in the paper as amended, subject to a revision of Appendix "A" so that the totals would be approximately 40 each for State and Navy, and 80 for War. (Subsequently circulated as N.I.A. 2.)

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I.A.B. 2nd Meeting

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in Room 5132-C,
New War Department Building,
on Tuesday, 26 March 1946, at 1530

1. POLICY ON LIQUIDATION OF THE STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT
(Memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence,
23 March 1946, same subject, for the Members, I.A.B.)

References: a. C.I.G. Directive No. 1.

b. Report of ad hoc committee established
pursuant reference a.

For consideration of the Memorandum by the Director
of Central Intelligence, 23 March, enclosing draft
directives on the above subject.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

Secretary, N.I.A.

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(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPINTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 5132-C
New War Department Building
on Tuesday, 26 March 1946, at 3:30 P.M.

Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Director of
 Central Intelligence, in the Chair

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. Ludwell L. Montague (representing Mr. Alfred
 McCormack, Special Assistant to the Secretary
 of State in Charge of Research and Intelligence)
 Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Assistant Chief of
 Staff, G-2, WDGS
 Commodore Charles J. Rend (Representing Rear Admiral
 Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence)
 Brig. General George C. McDonald, Assistant Chief of
 Air Staff, Intelligence
 Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau
 of Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

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Mr. Kingman Douglass, Central Intelligence Group
 [redacted] Central Intelligence Group
 [redacted] Central Intelligence

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Central Intelligence

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Central Intelligence

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Colonel Willis A. Perry, USA, Central Intelligence Group

SECRETARIAT

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Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, National Intelligence
 Authority

[redacted] Assistant Secretary

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~~TOP SECRET~~1. POLICY ON LIQUIDATION OF THE STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT

The directives proposed for submittal to the National Intelligence Authority were read and minor amendments agreed upon.

ADMIRAL SOUERS emphasized that the intention was not to absorb SSU as an entity within the Central Intelligence Group, but rather to assure the careful liquidation of the Unit, over a period of months, so as to utilize its services during that period and to permit the preservation and transfer to permanent departments and agencies of SSU elements found to be of continuing usefulness.

GENERAL VANDENBERG asked whether under the contemplated liquidation procedure, the G-2 of U.S. Forces, in the China Theater would be protected from the liquidation of the SSU unit now in China before other arrangements could be made by G-2 to provide for those operations considered essential by G-2.

ADMIRAL SOUERS said that this was an example of the departmental interests which the proposed liquidation directives were designed to protect. He recalled that General Vandenberg had recently forwarded to C.I.G. a plan for post-war intelligence in China as prepared by G-2, USFCT. In the course of planning post-war intelligence coverage in that area, it might be found desirable to charge C.I.G. itself with responsibility for filling certain gaps. However, C.I.G. could not enter such fields directly except by authorization of the National Intelligence Authority, and in the meantime it would be the task of the Director of Central Intelligence to insure that no available and necessary services were discarded, through liquidation of SSU, until services as good or better could be provided to take their place.

COMMODORE REND proposed a revision of the paper designed to clarify its language, but after Admiral Souers explained the reasons for the present language of the paper, Commodore Rend expressed his agreement.

MR. HOOVER said he was glad to see that the directives provided for gradual rather than abrupt liquidation, since this would more readily permit the retention of valuable elements by the Government. He thought the objectives were very satisfactorily expressed.

After concluding discussion,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:-

Concurred in the draft directives as amended (subsequently submitted to the National Intelligence Authority as N.I.A. 3).

2. C.I.G. WEEKLY SUMMARY

ADMIRAL SOUERS reported that plans for issuance of a C.I.G. Weekly Summary were in hand. The Central Reports Staff had worked up several practice issues. However, it was clear that if the Weekly were to fulfill its real function--and be more than a rehash of preceding Daily Summaries--two or three seasoned intelligence officers with specialized experience would have to be added to the staff. He was attempting to strengthen the present staff with this in mind, by negotiations with the several departments.

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:-

Took note of the above comments.

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~~TOP SECRET~~3. J.I.C. PAPERS

THE DIRECTOR said that arrangements had been made with the Joint Intelligence Committee for C.I.G. to receive copies of appropriate J.I.C. papers. In reply the Secretary of J.I.C. had suggested that all C.I.G. papers be furnished to his office for file and for the use of the Joint Intelligence Staff. Admiral Souers was willing to send appropriate C.I.G. papers to the Secretary of J.I.C., but felt that many papers of C.I.G. would not be of benefit to J.I.S. and should therefore not be sent.

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:-

Concurred with Admiral Souers' proposed policy.

4. SPECIAL AGENTS

GENERAL VANDENBERG inquired how soon the Central Intelligence Group would be in a position to interview the individuals who are now presenting themselves as prospective special agents abroad. General Vandenberg said there were a number of these candidates, and that he was using a few of them. He is anxious to turn such activities over to the Central Intelligence Group, however, as soon as possible, because of the danger that agents from different agencies may get crossed up in the field.

ADMIRAL SOUERS stated that he wanted to be completely prepared to conduct such operations before interviewing or hiring any individuals. He does not want to confuse the permanent program with the existing operations of SSU. One of the biggest problems will be to find the appropriate man to head this operation, who can then utilize the services of these individuals on a professional basis. In the meantime, Admiral Souers would prefer that existing agencies conduct their operations in this field until a permanent program has been decided upon by the N.I.A. and established. He feels that one of the most urgent elements in this program is the use of ordinary business, scientific and professional men and travellers who are going abroad. This will not be a "cloak and dagger" type of operation, but will require careful organization.

GENERAL VANDENBERG expressed the belief, and Admiral Souers agreed, that all such clandestine operations should be under a single directing head.

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:-

Took note of the above discussion.

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I.A.B. 3rd Meeting

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 4252,
New War Department Building,
on Monday, 8 April 1946, at 3:00 p.m.

Mr. Kingman Douglass, Acting Director of
Central Intelligence, in the Chair

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. Alfred McCormack, Special Assistant to
the Secretary of State in Charge of
Research and Intelligence
Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Assistant Chief
of Staff, G-2, WDGS
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval
Intelligence
Brig. General George C. McDonald, Assistant
Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence

ALSO PRESENT

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Intelligence Group	
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Intelligence Group	

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Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary,
National Intelligence Authority

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IAB 3rd Meeting

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MR. McCORMACK submitted the letter in Enclosure "A" for consideration.

MR. DOUGLASS asked for the comments of the other members on the suggestion in Mr. McCormack's letter.

GENERAL VANDENBERG felt that the Secretary of State had considerable influence in the Congress and might well be able to secure the requested appropriation if he so desired. Therefore, until the Secretary of State requests assistance from the other N.I.A. members, General Vandenberg is very reluctant to advise the Secretary of War to take any action. General Vandenberg noted that Admiral Souers in the last N.I.A. meeting had already expressed the opinion, from the viewpoint of C.I.G., that more than \$2,000,000 was required for State Department intelligence. General Vandenberg understood that the Secretaries of War and the Navy had concurred with Admiral Souers.

ADMIRAL INGLIS agreed with General Vandenberg that N.I.A. action should not be taken until the Secretary of State requested such assistance. Admiral Inglis asked whether Mr. McCormack was representing the Secretary of State in presenting this matter.

MR. McCORMACK explained that his action was not taken on a specific request from the Secretary of State. In his capacity as Special Assistant, however, Mr. McCormack felt that it was his duty to do all in his power to secure the appropriation which the Secretary of State had requested and had not officially revised or withdrawn. He admitted that there was some difference of opinion within the Department of State as to the organization and even the need for intelligence activities in that Department.

ADMIRAL INGLIS did not wish to comment upon any matters of internal disagreement within the Department of State. He felt, however, that the Central Intelligence Group should take over from the Department the basic intelligence research and analysis function.

MR. McCORMACK stated that he was not insisting that any action be taken, but he thought it entirely appropriate that the Board advise the N.I.A. what effect the reported action of the House Appropriations Subcommittee, if sustained by the Congress, would have upon the work of the Central Intelligence Group.

GENERAL VANDENBERG believed that the N.I.A. would always have difficulty in such cases until it has its own operating funds. With such funds its recommendations regarding departmental budgets will have more weight with Congress. So long as its funds come from the various Departments, however, its recommendations regarding budgets will not have great influence. General Vandenberg questioned whether this Board should become involved in this matter at this time, or whether it would not be preferable to find out first what the Secretary of State proposes to do.

MR. McCORMACK believed that this Board has the authority to advise the N.I.A. at this time on its own initiative.

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GENERAL VANDENBERG maintained that Admiral Souers had already advised the N.I.A. of the C.I.G. views on this point; the only question at present was whether that advice was sufficient.

MR. DOUGLASS thought there was an additional question of how much burden would be placed upon the War and Navy Departments to fill the gap created by the lack of a State Department intelligence organization. He thought this might require an increase in War and Navy Department budgets for intelligence.

ADMIRAL INGLIS pointed out that the Navy Department intelligence budget had already been submitted. It might, therefore, be harder to change that than to attempt to retain the State Department budget.

GENERAL VANDENBERG felt that if the State Department intelligence budget was refused, Congress would react unfavorably to a subsequent War and Navy Department request for additional appropriations for the same purpose.

ADMIRAL INGLIS believed that the Board should either suggest doing nothing, or recommend to the N.I.A. that the research and analysis function be transferred from State to C.I.G. In the latter case, he felt that the personnel assigned to C.I.G. should be carefully screened and that the funds for research and analysis should come from the State Department for the 1947 fiscal year. He thought that C.I.G. should have an independent budget for the 1948 fiscal year.

GENERAL VANDENBERG thought that the N.I.A. was already in a difficult situation for the coming year, and questioned whether the additional burden of a research and analysis unit should be added during that time. He was in agreement, however, with the ultimate desirability of having such a research and analysis unit in C.I.G.

MR. DOUGLASS thought that the Secretary of State might feel that \$2,000,000 was enough to meet his needs and would be reluctant to transfer anything to C.I.G. Mr. Douglass, however, also agreed with the desirability of a research and analysis unit in C.I.G.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that if the State Department decided to decentralize intelligence, he did not think that Department could object to C.I.G. assuming the research and analysis function.

GENERAL McDONALD thought that the N.I.A. should not do anything unless the Secretary of State requested its assistance.

MR. McCORMACK pointed out that so far as the official record is concerned, the Secretary of State had requested over \$5,000,000 for intelligence, which the Bureau of the Budget had reduced to about \$4,000,000.

ADMIRAL INGLIS thought that C.I.G. could be properly concerned about the loss of the \$330,000 earmarked for its operations.

GENERAL VANDENBERG thought that the C.I.G. had a proper interest in this budget, but that the actions of C.I.G. should depend on what action the Secretary of State planned to take. General Vandenberg therefore thought that the first step should be for the Director of Central Intelligence to discuss the matter with the Secretary of State and find out his views and proposed actions.

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COLONEL NICHOLAS questioned whether the Director of Central Intelligence, with the concurrence of this Board, could not advise the Secretary of State of the detrimental effect upon C.I.G. of the proposed cut in the budget.

GENERAL VANDENBERG agreed. He thought that if the Secretary of State indicated that he felt further action in support of his intelligence budget was unnecessary, this Board might justifiably express its alarm at that time.

MR. McCORMACK suggested that his letter be tabled until the Director of Central Intelligence had seen the Secretary of State and until the House Appropriations Committee had acted on the budget.

MR. DOUGLASS thought the solution might be to advise Admiral Leahy of the situation.

GENERAL VANDENBERG thought the C.I.G. should find out what the Secretary of State intends to do. If he intends to accept the refusal of the budget without further action on his part, the C.I.G. should express its alarm. However, if the Secretary of State proposes to take all possible action in support of his budget, General Vandenberg believed that no further action was necessary by C.I.G.

MR. McCORMACK noted that the great difficulty is the uncertainty in the minds of his employees created by the action of the House Appropriations Subcommittee. This uncertainty causes the capable personnel to resign in favor of more secure employment.

MR. DOUGLASS agreed to attempt to see the Secretary of State as suggested.

ADMIRAL INGLIS suggested that the possibility of transferring the research and analysis function from State to the C.I.G. might also be discussed with the Secretary of State.

GENERAL VANDENBERG expressed his willingness to concur in such a transfer if State agreed to finance the operations for the next year. He believed, however, that C.I.G. should not oppose the State Department if it desired to retain that function.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that he still considered the transfer as the best ultimate solution.

GENERAL VANDENBERG thought that the Director of Central Intelligence might find out from the Secretary of State his reactions to a recommendation by this Board that C.I.G. assume this research and analysis function. General Vandenberg thought that intelligence would be forthcoming if this function was in either the State Department or the C.I.G., but he agreed that transfer to C.I.G. was the preferable solution.

MR. McCORMACK expressed the belief that the Secretary of State has not yet formulated a definite opinion regarding the ultimate form or composition of the intelligence activities in the State Department.

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After further discussion,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:-

a. Agreed to recommend to the Director of Central Intelligence that he:

- (1) Advise the Secretary of State of the adverse effect, upon the work of the Central Intelligence Group, of a substantial reduction or deletion of the 1947 appropriation for intelligence work in the Department of State.
- (2) Ascertain the views and proposed actions of the Secretary of State regarding this appropriation.
- (3) Ascertain, if the opportunity arises, the views of the Secretary of State as to the possibility that the intelligence research and analysis function, for which this appropriation was requested, might be transferred from the Department of State to the Central Intelligence Group.

b. Agreed to defer further consideration of Mr. McCormack's letter (Enclosure hereto) pending the above action by the Director of Central Intelligence and further information concerning the action of the House Appropriations Committee on the 1947 budget for State Department intelligence work.

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E N C L O S U R E

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 8, 1946

Dear Col. Douglass:

The 1947 appropriation for the intelligence work of the State Department is now before the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives. The Secretary of State originally requested an appropriation of over \$5,000,000, which the Bureau of the Budget then cut down to about \$4,200,000. There was a rumor in the press last week that the Appropriations Committee might make a further drastic cut and might even eliminate the intelligence appropriation entirely.

The Director of Central Intelligence has recently expressed his concern for the continuance in the State Department of a strong intelligence unit. That would not be possible if a drastic cut in the appropriation were made, and I am therefore drawing your attention to the matter, with the suggestion that you obtain the views of the Intelligence Advisory Board as to whether a recommendation by the National Intelligence Authority in support of the program of the Secretary of State might not be in order.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ ALFRED McCORMACK

Col. Kingman Douglass
Acting Director of Central Intelligence
New War Department Building
Washington, D.C.

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Enclosure

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COPY NO. 17

I.A.B. 4th Meeting

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA

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For the Meeting to be held in Room 5106,
New War Department Building,
on Thursday, 9 May 1946, at 1430

1. POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
(C.I.G. 7 and C.I.G. 7/1)

For consideration of the amendments to C.I.G. 7 circulated in C.I.G. 7/1.

2. PROVISION FOR MONITORING OF PRESS AND PROPAGANDA BROADCASTS OF FOREIGN POWERS
(C.I.G. 1/1 and 1/2)

For consideration of the amendments to C.I.G. 1/1 proposed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, as circulated in C.I.G. 1/2.

3. DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE ON USSR
(C.I.G. 8 and C.I.G. 8/1)

For consideration of the amendments to C.I.G. 8 proposed by the Chief of Naval Intelligence and circulated in C.I.G. 8/1.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.,

Secretary, N.I.A.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPINTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 5106
New War Department Building
on Thursday, 9 May 1946, at 2:30 P.M.



Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Director of
 Central Intelligence, in the Chair

MEMBERS PRESENT

Dr. William L. Langer, Special Assistant to
 the Secretary of State in Charge of Re-
 search and Intelligence
 Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Assistant Chief
 of Staff, G-2, W.D.G.S.
 Commodore Charles J. Rend (representing Rear Ad-
 miral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval In-
 telligence)
 Brig. General George C. McDonald, Assistant
 Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence
 Mr. D. M. Ladd, for Items 1 and 2 (representing
 Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal
 Bureau of Investigation)

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. Kingman Douglass, Deputy Director, Central
 Intelligence Group
 Colonel M. N. Huston, G-2
 Captain R. K. Davis, USN, O.N.I.
 Colonel E. P. Mussett, A-2
 Lt. Colonel F. K. Newcomer, G-2

 Central Intelligence Group 25X1
 SN, Central Intelligence Group
 Central Intelligence Group
 (for Item 1), Central
 USN (for Items 2-4), Central
 Central Intelligence Group
 Colonel W. A. Perry, Central Intelligence Group
 Central Intelligence Group 25X1

SECRETARIAT

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, National
 Intelligence Authority 25X1
 Mr. J. K. Tibby, Assistant Secretary

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1. POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
(C.I.G. 7 and C.I.G. 7/1)

The proposed amendments to C.I.G. 7, as contained in C.I.G. 7/1, were taken under consideration.

ADMIRAL SOUERS was of the opinion that the screening committee recommended by the Chief of Naval Intelligence in C.I.G. 7/1 would be difficult to administer and, in fact, was an unnecessary duplication of other provisions of the paper, since Paragraph 8 of C.I.G. 7 provided that no individuals could be certified for duties with the Central Intelligence Group until after a security inquiry which would include a records check of member agencies of the I.A.B.

COMMODORE REND felt that it is impossible to do too much in the interests of security. He saw no completely desirable substitute for the proposed formal screening committee, even if it were to involve some degree of duplication, and he was sure that he spoke the views of the Chief of Naval Intelligence in this connection.

ADMIRAL SOUERS agreed that all practicable security measures should be taken even if they involved extra work, but he thought all such measures should be practical and capable of efficient administration.

In the course of further discussion, in which other members expressed satisfaction with the language of the section as written, COLONEL BOBERG proposed as the basis of a generally agreeable solution the revision of Paragraph 7 of C.I.G. 7 to read:

"7. Reports of investigations will be subject to review in each case by the Security Officer, C.I.G., who will verify that member departments other than the nominating department have cleared the nominee. Final decision as to acceptability of an individual for an assignment to the Central Intelligence Group will rest with the Director of Central Intelligence."

The amendment was accepted.

The recommendations of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and of the State Department were then considered. ADMIRAL SOUERS said that he agreed with Mr. Hoover's criticism of Paragraph 9 of C.I.G. 7 and believed that the remedy should be the addition to that paragraph of the following provision:

"In each case of clearance based on a previous satisfactory character and loyalty investigation or on the basis of a minimum of ten (10) years honorable Government service, a check of the appropriate records in the Department of State; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Military Intelligence Service, War Department, and Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, will be made prior to the issuance of a clearance certificate."

MR. LADD and other members of the Intelligence Advisory Board agreed to this change.

DR. LANGER set forth the purpose of the State Department recommendations covering exceptional cases, but after discussion

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it was agreed that the provisions of C.I.G. 7 (Paragraph 13) were satisfactory to all concerned. After accepting further minor amendments offered by the Central Planning Staff,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:-

Approved C.I.G. 7, subject to the amendments above
(Enclosure to C.I.G. 7 subsequently issued as C.I.G.
Directive No. 8).

2. PROVISION FOR MONITORING OF PRESS AND PROPAGANDA BROADCASTS OF FOREIGN POWERS
(C.I.G. 1/1 and C.I.G. 1/2)

ADMIRAL SOUERS reviewed the history of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS). He noted the recommendation in his own report (C.I.G. 1/1) that the service be continued under C.I.G. direction and War Department administration, and invited attention to the dissenting recommendation of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, in C.I.G. 1/2, that the project be administered by the Department of State or by the C.I.G. directly. On the second point, Admiral Souers could not agree with General Vandenberg that the Central Intelligence Group should administer such a service directly. The C.I.G. is not an independent agency and thus is not empowered to sign contracts, nor does it have technical personnel readily available. While the C.I.G. was authorized to perform "such services of common concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally", he believed the most efficient procedure in this case was probably that outlined in C.I.G. 1/1.

GENERAL VANDENBERG agreed it would be difficult for the C.I.G. to assume direct administrative control of FBIS at this time. Yet he felt that the position of the War Department should be appreciated and understood. As he saw it, the War Department had accepted the interim responsibility for administering FBIS until the end of this fiscal year, in order to serve the many Government agencies interested in the product of monitoring. Now, more than ever, it was clear that the bulk of the information obtained by this means was not primarily related to military intelligence; rather it related to political and economic intelligence, and for this reason was surely of greater interest to the Department of State than to the War Department. He doubted whether G-2 could continue to justify requests for FBIS appropriations for these reasons, and he felt there should be no delay in placing the administration of FBIS in an agency of primary interest, such as State, or in C.I.G. as a centralized service.

ADMIRAL SOUERS noted that the disposition proposed in C.I.G. 1/1 would require the approval of the National Intelligence Authority. Should the Authority agree that the War Department was the appropriate agency to administer the service, it could be presumed that the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy could defend the conclusion in relation to appropriations.

GENERAL VANDENBERG thought it would be easier for the three Secretaries to defend the service within State or C.I.G. than in the War Department.

ADMIRAL SOUERS said he had originally thought the State Department would be the ideal lodgment for FBIS, and in fact he believed the former Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (Mr. McCormack) had once held the same view. However, there had recently been so much question as to the scope of the opera-

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I.A.B. 4th Meeting

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tions to be undertaken by State that he now thought it best to leave the administrative responsibility where it was--that is, in the War Department--with over-all direction from C.I.G.

GENERAL VANDENBERG pointed out that, since only about 5% of all foreign broadcasts are monitored, priorities must be constantly shifted to meet the most important requirements. The War Department is unable to anticipate the shifting requirements for political and economic information, and thus to adjust its coverage of foreign output, as promptly as would a directly interested agency such as the Department of State. Moreover, all that would be necessary for such a change would be to transfer the existing technical group and point their activities in the direction of major interest.

DR. LANGER said he recognized the force of General Vandenberg's argument. Much of the material which FBIS was obliged to cover dealt with political, economic, and psychological developments of the greatest interest and importance to the State Department. It might be logical to place FBIS administration under State. At the same time, in view of the current heavy burden on State Department administrative facilities, he was not sure that the Department could now assume a new responsibility of such dimensions. The subject was one on which he could not express a final judgment without checking with his own Department.

GENERAL VANDENBERG added that G-2 would be glad to lend to State the services of necessary experts, and to arrange for a gradual transfer of administrative responsibility, if such measures would assist a solution.

After concluding discussion, and on the motion of Admiral Souers,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:-

- a. Deferred action on C.I.G. 1/1 pending further study.
- b. Noted that the Director of Central Intelligence directed the Central Planning Staff to consult with appropriate officials in G-2 and the State Department as to the practicability of transferring the monitoring function to the State Department, and to recommend any revisions in C.I.G. 1/1 deemed appropriate.

3. DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE ON USSR
(C.I.G. 8 and C.I.G. 8/1)

The memorandum of the Director of Central Intelligence (C.I.G. 8) and the proposed amendments thereto (C.I.G. 8/1) were considered by the Members.

After discussion, the following amendments to the Enclosure to C.I.G. 8 were adopted:

- a. In Paragraph 3 the fourth sentence was revised to read:
"The Planning Committee will select a chairman from among its representatives. The Secretary shall be furnished by a member agency by mutual agreement."
- b. In paragraph 4.a., the words "as necessary and available" were inserted at the end of the second sentence.
- c. In paragraph 4.b., the word "practicable" was inserted at the end of the third sentence.

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4. DISTRIBUTION OF C.I.G. DAILY SUMMARY

ADMIRAL SOUERS advised that inquiry had been received from the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as to the possibility of his being placed on the distribution for the C.I.G. Daily Summary. He noted that since the distribution of the Summary had been established by the National Intelligence Authority, any increased distribution would require the Authority's approval..

After discussion,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:-

Noted that the Director of Central Intelligence would discuss informally with the Secretary of State the distribution of the C.I.G. Daily Summary to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

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I.A.B. 4th Meeting

- 4 -

Notes on IAB 4th mtg.

CIG 7

- V — Don't like for reason that very dangerous ^{that} ~~pages~~ ^{setup} ~~should be preserved~~ ^{off record}
- Sanctity of files of any organ
- \$ — Not sound because been checked by 9/8a before certified
- R — Can't do too much on security — formal screening bd. ^{know} & Adm Inglis will insist — One way like but another
- L — Won't be done by 8a?
- R — ^{Adm Inglis} insists on formal bd. meeting
- V — Will not gain ^{by my man}, because will be already cleared
- L — Checked by own agency & then referred to screening bd.
- \$ — Doesn't seem necessary to certify & then screen — Duplication
- V — In effect, Inglis make G-2 resp. for clearance of State & navy people — Why accept resp. — Have check when my people make records check
- ✓ S — Difficult admin
- R — Have one of your men on comm. Bobeg — Only reports ^{if under 97} would be favorable.
- McD — CIG 7 accepted w/o change
- ✓ Bobeg — Changed wording (OK)
- ✓ S — Added sentence 99 (OK)

who will verify records check with all other departments:

- L - What had in mind was poss. employ fellow born in Canada - might have US parents - By rigid rules lose very useful person - ~~to~~
- S - Think unusual case that other depts wouldn't also clear that man - Reason ~~no~~ don't object to these ^{complete} measures because
- Lay - ^{CR} 8a(2) OK ^{handling all material}
- Sands ^{q71} Eliminate those coming over with advice or witnesses. OK

CIG 1/1

- S - Reviewed history of FBIS & made pts. at issue
 - Agree on interest (State heavier because of propaganda interest) - so feeling of war if goes to any dept. to State or to CIG under central services provision
 - Raise question w/ V abt more efficiently -
 Hard for CIG (not ind. agency, cannot sign contracts, has no radio personnel)
- V - Agree hard for CIG to take over - ^{big} stepped in when money relatively free on interim basis - now money not free - get into right channel either State or CIG - G-2 not ^{able to} depend on mil intell basis & everyone suffer.
- S - If NIA approves - all should depend ^{for NIA}
- V - Easier to depend if in State or CIG, rather than G-2 than CIG
- S - Orig thought State & agreed by McC - But so much turmoil ^{involved} felt leave where is - Like to see hitched on one ^{not} for admin - as far as direction, CIG

8

- V - State more eff. for all because even in heyday covering only 5% - To cover, constantly, shift - Have to know constantly what state interest is
- L - would have to be enlarged?
- V - Eventually build to 5% if expert like Gallys figured coverage by sampling
- S - Which broad casts most interesting, could set up mech for that - Other aspect is technical
- V - Have ^{tech.} gp - all have to do is take gp + pt. them to direction of interest - Separate from Sig C
- L - Recognize force of what V says - ^{much of} Pol, econ, psych character - Regard material externally, ^{state} inf - If 5%, ~~must~~ should direct toward ion curtain - Wonder in ^{view of burden on} state admin if I should take now
- V - Glad to assist w/ people now running it
- S - hat desire to thrust on War - must work out on reasonable basis - Pass over at meeting ~~that~~ I look into since just stepped in
- V - Glad to have exp. talk - do it by gradual basis any way you desire.
- L - Have CPS in touch with G-2 ^{people running} experts + State. & see what can be worked out.

CIG 8

- P - OK either way - If changed, State change rep.
- ✓ L - Why not have Secy vote since Chairman of Planning Comm.
- (?) - Actual people working proposed - Big job as Secy & like free to do it
- P - Like as is
- McD - Is interim until CIG takes over? - If not, establishes precedent
- P - This will be long time - not thing that CIG takes over
- McD - Getting open & question whether desire to get that open.
- P - Two comm - Secy PC, Ch WC to ~~watch~~ make continuity
- L - all more reason to have Secy have vote
- R - Val. man as rep. - If made Secy, lose val. man
- Davis - Then have 2 votes
- P - Only one vote for each dept.
- R - If State spare full time, OK
- (2) - All right now but if personalities change
- P - Don't think pick Secy if dept can't furnish
- S - how make state furnish 2 rep.
- Lay - leave out "and - vote".

Davis - as necess & avail. (OK)

McD - Amend.

moose - allow people in each agency to have word in priority as compared w/ JCS etc.

- S - Reg from Hoover that, since furnishes daily mat from 3 Amer, would help in evaluation to receive Daily Summary - question whether IAB would agree, esp State
- McD - So helpful, think shouldn't hurt relations - Why not talk w/ Sec State
- V - Feel things in book Sec St wouldn't want handed, Hoover knows already - might be OK if ~~and~~ assumes only H & ^{maybe} one other read it
- L - Can't say but should think in business might be adv. to H & dep. - no harm on restrictive basis
- V - H very safe if understands why & how far can go
- S - Not worried abt security - Thinking more of Byrnes fear of things going even so far as now
- V - Valuable way of getting H to look for things of CIG interest
- S - Talk over w/ Sec.

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I.A.B. 5th Meeting

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 5132
New War Department Building
on Monday, 10 June 1946, at 2:30 P.M.

Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of
Central Intelligence
Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, in the Chair

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. William L. Langer, Special Assistant to
the Secretary of State for Research and
Intelligence
Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director
of Intelligence, WDGS (Designate)
Commodore Charles J. Rend (representing Rear
Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval
Intelligence)
Brig. General George C. McDonald, Assistant
Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence
Mr. D. M. Ladd (representing Mr. J. Edgar Hoover,
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation)

ALSO PRESENT

Dr. Kingman Douglass, Deputy Director, Central
Intelligence Group
Colonel Carter W. Clarke, G-2
Captain R.K. Davis, USN, O.N.I.
Captain J.J. Rochefort, USN, O.N.I.
Colonel E.P. Mussett, A-2
Lt. Colonel F.K. Newcomer, G-2
[redacted] Central Intelligence Group
[redacted] SN, Central Intelligence Group
[redacted] Central Intelligence Group
[redacted] Central Intelligence Group
[redacted] Central Intelligence Group
Colonel W.A. Perry, Central Intelligence Group
[redacted] Central Intelligence Group

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Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, National
Intelligence Authority
Mr. J.K. Tibby, Assistant Secretary

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CONFIDENTIAL1. PROVISION OF MONITORING OF PRESS AND PROPAGANDA BROADCASTS OF FOREIGN POWERS

(C.I.G. 1/1; C.I.G. 1/2, and C.I.G. 1/3)

ADMIRAL SOUERS recalled that the proposals raised in C.I.G. 1/1 and 1/2 had been considered provisionally in the previous meeting. In view of General Vandenberg's suggestion that the operation of FBIS be assumed by State, that department had been asked to make a study of its capabilities. The State Department replied (in C.I.G. 1/3) that while they were keenly interested in having the monitoring service continue it would be impossible for the Department to assume administrative responsibility for FBIS during the next fiscal year. ADMIRAL SOUERS felt that these developments justified the Members in approving C.I.G. 1/1, which in substance called for War Department operation of FBIS under directives from the Director of Central Intelligence as to collecting and distributing missions.

DR. LANGER underscored the reasons leading to State's conclusions. These were chiefly technical and budgetary. For example, State estimated that the administrative costs of FBIS would mean a 50 per cent increase in the entire amount budgeted for State's intelligence service--at a time when even the presently budgeted amounts had not been finally approved by Congress. There were also questions of the establishment of new stations in military zones, the transfer of some facilities now under British auspices, the procurement of new equipment, and the like--all of which he felt could be more effectively handled by the War Department at present.

GENERAL VANDENBERG observed that an eventual alternative to State or War Department administration would be direct control by Central Intelligence, if C.I.G. were to obtain an operating appropriation of its own. But such considerations could not apply in the solution of the immediate problem.

In the course of the general discussion which followed it was brought out by ADMIRAL SOUERS that the Central Intelligence Group at present could not accept a transfer of funds from War for direct administration of FBIS, since C.I.G. was not an authorized disbursing agency. It was therefore the consensus of the Members that the best immediate solution was operation by the Director of Central Intelligence with the administrative assistance of the War Department.

After concluding discussion,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:-

Approved C.I.G. 1/1 subject to textual clarification to insure that the recommendation to the National Intelligence Authority provided for operation of the monitoring function by the Director of Central Intelligence with the administrative assistance of the War Department. (Report to N.I.A. to be circulated as N.I.A. 5).

2. C.I.G. WEEKLY SUMMARY

ADMIRAL SOUERS invited discussion and criticism of the trial issue of the C.I.G. Weekly Summary circulated on 7 June. The discussion which followed centered on two issues developed by DR. LANGER: first, whether interpretive articles such as the Weekly contained could be prepared more effectively in C.I.G.,

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as in the trial issue, or by specialists in the contributing departments; and second, the suggestion that the Weekly concentrate on items where the C.I.G. has something new or novel to add to the normal intelligence produced by the departments.

As to the first point, DR. LANGER emphasized that he was wholly in favor of the undertaking represented by the Weekly Summary. However, it was essential to make the Weekly the best publication of which "this city" is capable. The job of interpretation needed to be done by people who have "responsibility and weight". For instance, he thought it inevitable that the best political comment would be obtained from the political sections of the State Department, where there was responsibility for policy as well as analysis, and that C.I.G. could hardly build up comparably well-informed groups of specialists within its own staff. On this assumption, he concluded that perhaps the preparation of articles for the Weekly should be transferred to the departmental experts. In this case, DR. LANGER thought, the C.I.G. editors would be left with the true function of correlating political intelligence judgments from State with related military judgments from the armed services. On his second point, he believed it might be a mistake for the Weekly to offer interpretations of matters already well covered in other publications, or where the Weekly did not have "something to add".

In acknowledging these issues, MR. MONTAGUE observed that the Weekly was not, of course, to be a summary of all the incidents of a week but an attempt to put into perspective some of the most important incidents and trends. Most of the events with which the Weekly dealt had already been reported briefly--and without opportunity for elucidation--in the C.I.G. daily summaries preceding. The Weekly was to provide background and "depth". The fact that the trial issue was heavily "political" in substance reflected the undermanned state of the reports staff; he was awaiting the arrival of several specialists from the contributing departments.

As to sources of material for the Weekly, MR. MONTAGUE thought it was clear that these would always be primarily the departmental cables and telegrams, plus departmental summaries such as the G-2 Weekly Summary and the State Department situation reports. The reports staff did not receive "raw" or unevaluated data. A much greater degree of contact with the departmental specialists was imperative, he agreed, and when the full staff had been assembled such contact should and would be continuous.

ADMIRAL SOUERS commented that C.I.G. had been fully aware of departmental responsibilities for the analysis of intelligence--the State Department's responsibility for foreign political intelligence, and so on. There was no attempt to compete with specialized summaries produced in State, War, and Navy. On the other hand, as he saw it, the problem was to produce a "reader's digest" which would collect and condense the most significant judgments from all these sources. He had been reluctant to begin the Weekly without an adequately manned staff and had given some thought to asking Members of I.A.B. to designate departmental experts who could meet with the reports staff on a regular basis, to insure policy screening at least--though not necessarily to write the articles themselves.

GENERAL VANDENBERG proposed that the Weekly continue publication under the common observation of the Members of I.A.B., and that he be advised whenever it was found that departmental views had been distorted or otherwise improperly represented.

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Specifically, he asked Dr. Langer to arrange a means whereby political intelligence texts could be promptly checked when necessary with a State Department specialist. He transmitted further specific comments and suggestions from G-2 regarding the trial issue to Mr. Montague.

The Members of I.A.B. were in agreement with General Vandenberg's proposal.

COMMODORE REND commented that it was essential to commence regular publication of the Weekly, despite shortcoming that might be inevitable in early issues; and GENERAL McDONALD and MR. LADD thought that, in view of all the circumstances, the reports staff should be congratulated on a good beginning.

3. PROVISIONS FOR COORDINATING THE ACQUISITION OF FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS

(C.I.G. 9)

ADMIRAL SOUERS noted that replies had not yet been received from all Members regarding C.I.G. 9, which had been circulated for informal consideration. After brief discussion, during which it was agreed to reduce the classification of the paper to "Restricted",

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:-

Approved C.I.G. 9. (Enclosures to be submitted to N.I.A. as N.I.A. 4.)

4. REMARKS BY ADMIRAL SOUERS

ADMIRAL SOUERS said he wanted to take occasion, on being relieved as Director of Central Intelligence, to express to all Members of the Intelligence Advisory Board his appreciation for the unstinted cooperation he had received from each one. He took great satisfaction in turning over his duties to General Vandenberg.

GENERAL VANDENBERG, in an acknowledgment in behalf of all those present, expressed the hope that the work of Central Intelligence should be maintained at the standard set by Admiral Souers.

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I.A.B. 5th Meeting

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in Room 5136-E
New War Department Building
on Monday, 10 June 1946, at 1430

1. PROVISION FOR MONITORING OF PRESS AND PROPAGANDA
BROADCASTS OF FOREIGN POWERS
(C.I.G. 1/1; C.I.G. 1/2; C.I.G. 1/3)

For consideration of the recommendation by
the Director of Central Intelligence obtained
in C.I.G. 1/3.

2. C.I.G. WEEKLY SUMMARY

For discussion of the views of the Intelligence
Advisory Board concerning the first issue of
the C.I.G. Weekly Summary which will be distri-
buted on Friday, 7 June 1946.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.,

Secretary, N.I.A.

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I.A.B. 6th Meeting

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in Room 2169
New War Department Building
on Friday, 28 June 1946, at 2:30 p.m.

1. FUNCTIONS OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
(C.I.G. 10)

For consideration of the recommendations contained in
C.I.G. 10.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.,
Secretary, N.I.A.

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IAB 6th Meeting

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I.A.B. 6th Meeting

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPINTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 2169
New War Department Building
on Friday, 28 June 1946, at 2:30 P.M.

Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of
Central Intelligence, in the Chair.
Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, former Director
of Central Intelligence

MEMBERS PRESENT

Dr. William L. Langer, Special Assistant to
the Secretary of State for Research and
Intelligence
Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director
of Intelligence, W.D.G.S.
Commodore Charles J. Rend, USN (Representing
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of
Naval Intelligence)
Colonel E. P. Mussett (Representing Brig.
General George C. McDonald, Assistant
Chief of Air Staff-2)

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. Park Armstrong, Department of State
Captain R. K. Davis, USN, ONI
Colonel Joseph A. Michela, G-2

SECRETARIAT

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, National
Intelligence Authority

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IAB 6th Meeting

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1. FUNCTIONS OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (C.I.G. 10)

GENERAL VANDENBERG expressed regret that the original version had caused such turmoil. He explained that his primary purpose was to get the people necessary to do the job of assisting the three departments. He wants these people to try to find out where, because of lack of people or money, the departments have to stop their intelligence activities short of national requirements. General Vandenberg explained that he was not trying to usurp any departmental prerogatives. He realized that C.I.G. cannot do its job unless there is an intelligence system within State, War and Navy which is as strong as possible. He wants to find out where the departments have to stop and thus where there are deficiencies or holes in our intelligence organization. General Vandenberg stated that he had talked with the Secretaries of War and the Navy, and with Fleet Admiral Leahy, and they were all in agreement with his concept. He would, however, welcome any comments or criticism on the subject paper.

DR. LANGER explained that he was very interested in making C.I.G. a real going concern, including provision of the necessary money and people. His chief objection to the paper was that it was rather loose in places and would subsequently give rise to suspicions. The State Department had no objection to a large part of the paper. It did object, however, to paragraph 2 of Appendix "A". Dr. Langer felt that this paragraph went beyond the provisions in the President's letter. He doubted that it was necessary for C.I.G. to undertake extensive research and analysis. He felt that if the departments showed themselves unable to do the job for C.I.G., specific authorization for C.I.G. to perform such functions could be given at that time. Dr. Langer also felt that it would be extremely difficult to define what fields were of primary or secondary interest to the departments.

GENERAL VANDENBERG felt that point would be covered, since he was required to obtain the concurrence of appropriate members of the Board in any given case.

DR. LANGER noted that the decision as to which member was appropriate in any case was left to the discretion of the Director. He felt that setting up the proposition of negotiating with individual members would cause the Board to pass into eclipse. He would be very sorry to see that happen, since solidarity of the Board gave necessary moral support to the Director. Dr. Langer explained that it was only because of the interest of State in C.I.G. that he would like to avoid unnecessary debate, acrimony, or any suggestion that would break down the solidarity of the Board. He thought that paragraph 2 should be more specific, and therefore circulated an alternative paragraph 2.

GENERAL VANDENBERG thought the alternative paragraph would tie his hands unnecessarily. If he is to produce national intelligence he must fill the holes as rapidly as possible. If he has to obtain approval by the entire Board in each case, it will become a debating society and no action will be taken.

DR. LANGER pointed out that the departments have definite functions and responsibilities which must be recognized. He noted that the Secretary of State has the responsibility of informing the President regarding the foreign situation and advising him of what should be done in that field.

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IAB 6th Meeting

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GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that one of the main purposes of this paper was to enable C.I.G. to define precisely the fields of primary interest to the departments.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN expressed his regret that he had to leave the meeting at this point, but stated that COLONEL MICHELA could vote for him unless there were particularly controversial issues involved. General Chamberlin then left the meeting.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that he must prepare a supplementary budget within the next few days or C.I.G. would be without necessary funds during the fiscal year 1947. He was therefore anxious to obtain N.I.A. approval of the concept of this paper to enable him to secure the necessary funds. He felt that C.I.G. would be unable to find the gaps in the intelligence situation unless it was able to perform the research and analysis operation.

DR. LANGER expressed the understanding that the Central Planning Staff was designed to find the gaps.

GENERAL VANDENBERG thought, and ADMIRAL SOUERS agreed, that this was a problem for research and not for planning. Unless C.I.G. actually performed research functions, it would not know where the gaps were.

DR. LANGER asked whether C.I.G. intended to have so large a staff that it would be able to take care of any conceivable emergency.

GENERAL VANDENBERG explained that he wanted only enough experts to find the holes. It would then be necessary to determine whether those holes could be filled by one of the departments or whether, in each particular field, the research and analysis should be centralized in C.I.G. In other words, he did not want to do the work now being done in the departments, but rather to find out what the departments cannot do.

DR. LANGER agreed with this concept, but felt that a revision of the wording of paragraph 2 was necessary.

After further discussion, a revision of paragraph 2 was accepted by the Board.

COMMODORE REND was concerned about the wording of paragraph 3 of Appendix "A", since it seemed to infringe upon the responsibility of each Board member to execute approved N.I.A. recommendations within his department.

The Board agreed to a re-wording of paragraph 3.

COMMODORE REND suggested that paragraph 4-a make it clear that C.I.G. would conduct such operations only outside the limits of the continental United States.

GENERAL VANDENBERG noted that the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had suggested a similar revision of paragraph 4-a, and this revision was accepted by the Board.

COLONEL MICHELA suggested re-wording the last two lines of paragraph 5 of Appendix "A", and a revision was subsequently agreed upon by the Board.

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THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:-

Concurred in C.I.G. 10 subject to the following amendments to Appendix "A" thereto and appropriate changes in Appendix "B":

a. Revise paragraph 2 to read:

"2. In performing the functions specified in paragraph 3-a of the President's letter, the Director of Central Intelligence is hereby authorized to undertake such research and analysis as may be necessary to determine what functions in the fields of national security intelligence are not being presently performed or are not being adequately performed. Based upon these determinations, the Director of Central Intelligence may centralize such research and analysis activities as may, in his opinion and that of the appropriate member or members of the Intelligence Advisory Board, be more efficiently or effectively accomplished centrally."

b. Revise paragraph 3 to read:

"3. In addition to the functions specified in paragraph 3-b of the President's letter and in accordance with paragraph 4 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1, the Director of Central Intelligence is hereby directed to act as the agent of this Authority in coordinating all Federal foreign intelligence activities related to the national security to ensure that the over-all policies and objectives established by this Authority are properly implemented and executed."

c. Revise paragraph 4-a to read:

"a. Conduct of all organized Federal espionage and counter-espionage operations outside the United States and its possessions for the collection of foreign intelligence information required for the national security."

d. Revise the last two lines of paragraph 5 to read:

"herein, in addition to the appropriations which can be made available for this purpose by the State, War and Navy Departments."

(Enclosure to C.I.G. 10 as amended subsequently submitted for N.I.A. consideration as N.I.A. 4.)

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IAB 6th Meeting

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I.A.B. 7th Meeting

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 2169
New War Department Building
on Monday, 26 August 1946, at 2:30 P.M.

Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of
Central Intelligence, in the Chair

MEMBERS PRESENT

Colonel William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to
the Secretary of State for Research and
Intelligence
Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director
of Intelligence, W.D.G.S.
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of
Naval Intelligence
Brig. General George C. McDonald, Assistant
Chief of Air Staff-2
Mr. C. H. Carson (representing Mr. J. Edgar
Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation)

ALSO PRESENT

Brig. General John A. Samford, U.S.A.
Dr. Kingman Douglass, Central Intelligence Group
Mr. A. S. Buford, State Department
Captain Ransom K. Davis, U.S.N.
Colonel Charles E. Taylor, U.S.A.
Colonel Robert Taylor III, U.S.A.
Colonel E. J. Treacy, U.S.A.
Lt. Colonel E. G. Edwards, U.S.A.
[REDACTED] Central Intelligence Group 25X1

SECRETARIAT

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, National
Intelligence Authority

SECRET

IAB 7th Meeting

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1. EXPLOITATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS CONCERNS,
NON-GOVERNMENTAL GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS WITH
CONNECTIONS ABROAD AS SOURCES OF FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

(C.I.G. 12/1)

GENERAL VANDENBERG explained that the need for coordination in this field is to assure that all agencies' views and requirements are given the same weight. It is also necessary to avoid the experiences during the war when as many as twelve agencies called on a single firm for the same information. It is considered that only C.I.G. could properly perform this coordinating function. In addition, C.I.G. will be able to place more people on the job than any other single agency. General Vandenberg then requested comments on the paper.

GENERAL SAMFORD stated that A-2 had no objection. They would like to see the paper approved as it stands if it is considered to be strong enough.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that his comments were primarily to clear up the wording. He questioned whether this paper referred to exploitation only in the United States and suggested that this point be cleared up.

GENERAL VANDENBERG confirmed the fact that the exploitation would occur only in the United States, and an amendment to that effect was agreed upon.

COMMANDER McMANUS also noted that the briefing would be done only with individuals who were going abroad on short trips, and an amendment to that effect was agreed upon.

MR. CARSON stated that the F.B.I. felt the directive was too broad since it might or could conflict with F.B.I.'s operations in the United States. Specifically the F.B.I. objected to including in this directive the exploitation of "non-government groups and individuals with connections abroad." He suggested that such groups and individuals be specifically defined or that this directive be confined to American business concerns.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that it was impossible to define specifically the groups and individuals which C.I.G. wished to exploit since they included any groups or individuals who might be sources of foreign intelligence information related to the national security. He thought that, in view of the President's directive, it might be necessary to put this paper before the N.I.A. if the F.B.I. objected to it. General Vandenberg noted that the term "investigations," which C.I.G. was precluded from making by paragraph 9 of the President's directive establishing the N.I.A., was an entirely different matter from the type of activities to be covered by C.I.G. 12/1. Under this proposed directive the C.I.G. would not be making investigations in the United States for internal security, criminal or counter intelligence purposes as the F.B.I. uses this term, but rather would be collecting foreign positive intelligence required for the national security.

MR. CARSON pointed out that the information in many cases would nevertheless include what the F.B.I. is seeking.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that whenever that was the case the information would be turned over to the F.B.I.

MR. CARSON noted that his concern was to avoid conflict in this borderline region between C.I.G. and F.B.I.

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GENERAL VANDENBERG questioned how there could be a conflict if the F.B.I. received any information of interest to it.

MR. CARSON thought that C.I.G. activities might conflict with similar F.B.I. activities and contacts.

GENERAL VANDENBERG quoted the following paragraphs from a letter from the Director of the F.B.I. concerning C.I.G. 12/1:

"In the discussion attached to this new proposed directive it is stated: 'Foreign intelligence information related to the national security, although it may be collected from sources whose headquarters are within the limits of the United States and its possessions, is definitely part of the national intelligence mission, the coordination of which is specifically a function of the National Intelligence Authority under the provisions of the President's letter of 22 January, 1946.' This statement is not in agreement with Section 9 of the President's letter of January 22 which states: 'Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize the making of investigations inside the continental limits of the United States and its possessions except as provided by law and Presidential Directives.'"

"I note that in the proposed directive it is stated that field agents of the Central Intelligence Group will establish and maintain liaison with the intelligence officers of local Army and Navy headquarters and Air Force headquarters. If this means that the CIG will establish offices in the United States or will operate field agents within the United States or its possessions, I am of the opinion that this is not within the provisions of the President's original directive. I did not understand that the President's original directive contemplated the Central Intelligence Group engaging in any such activities within the United States and its possessions."

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that he gathered from this letter that the F.B.I. feels that it has the exclusive right to collect any information within the continental limits of the United States. He pointed out that the Navy Department, and he understood the War Department, has always collected foreign intelligence information within the United States.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that he failed to see how the C.I.G. could contact business firms without establishing field offices for this purpose.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN asked whether it was planned to assign specific groups to be contacted by the various agencies. He thought it might be possible to specify which groups would be contacted by F.B.I. and which by other agencies.

GENERAL VANDENBERG explained that it is difficult to draw a line in that manner since, for example, shipping firms normally contacted by the Navy might have information of direct interest to the Army.

GENERAL SAMFORD said that he understood the purpose of this directive was primarily to coordinate recognized activities.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN suggested that the paper be amended to require consultation with the F.B.I. on the advisability of contacts of other than American business concerns. With that change he suggested that the meeting consider any further amendments and then submit the paper as amended to the N.I.A.

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MR. LAY quoted paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1 as follows:

"Any recommendation which you and the Intelligence Advisory Board approve unanimously and have the existing authority to execute may be put into effect without action by this Authority."

He pointed out that, if this directive were confined to activities of the State, War and Navy Departments and C.I.G., and the I.A.B. members representing those Departments concurred, the directive could be issued forthwith.

ADMIRAL INGLIS recommended, and GENERAL CHAMBERLIN concurred, that the F.B.I. be given an opportunity to study the amended version of C.I.G. 12/1.

GENERAL VANDENBERG suggested that Mr. Carson consult with the Director of F.B.I. as to whether the amended paper would be acceptable. If the F.B.I. concurred, the directive could be issued forthwith. If the F.B.I. did not concur, a split paper should then be submitted to the N.I.A.

The Board concurred with General Vandenberg's suggestions, subject to the understanding that if the F.B.I. did not concur, the Board would have another meeting prior to submitting the paper to the N.I.A.

ADMIRAL INGLIS suggested a footnote on page 6 defining the terms "central register" and "contact register." He also suggested an amendment of paragraph 3 g of the directive since, for example, Naval Reserve officers would prefer briefing by O.N.I., which therefore would obtain more information from them.

After further discussion of this paragraph an amendment was agreed upon.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that he wished the minutes to show an agreed interpretation of the meaning of paragraph 3 of the directive. For example, if O.N.I. makes a contact, the contact should be told that his name will be placed in the contact register. If the contact does not agree, Admiral Inglis wondered whether that meant that O.N.I. could not use this contact.

GENERAL VANDENBERG thought that the contact would be willing to agree if he knew that it would save him from interrogation by another agency for the same purpose.

GENERAL SAMFORD questioned why the contact needed to know that his name would be placed in the register.

ADMIRAL INGLIS felt that this was necessary in order to play fair and square.

GENERAL VANDENBERG suggested that the contact be asked as diplomatically as possible whether he objected to having his name in the contact register. If the contact would object, then ask him if he would mind having a representative of C.I.G. participate in the briefing and debriefing. If the contact still objected, the briefing agency should check with the C.I.G. as to what information other agencies might want.

GENERAL SAMFORD questioned whether the existence of the contact register should not be kept highly secret.

GENERAL VANDENBERG agreed that if possible the contact register should not be mentioned.

ADMIRAL INGLIS pointed out that individuals frequently volunteer their assistance. These contacts may state that their financial security, continued employment and possibly life itself

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depends on the assurance that the discussion will not go beyond the immediate participants. In such cases Admiral Inglis considered that it is not fair to give their names to the contact register without permission.

GENERAL VANDENBERG suggested that contacts be told that, to prevent their being approached by other agencies, a highly secure central point has been established where all contacts are cleared.

GENERAL SAMFORD felt, and it was agreed, that the names of contacts should be given to the contact register unless they insisted upon secrecy.

COLONEL EDDY suggested, and it was agreed upon, that certain changes be made in paragraphs 3 g and 5 of the proposed directive and that paragraph 4 thereof be deleted since the terms of that paragraph were already covered by previous directives.

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

- a. Concurred in Appendix "A" to C.I.G. 12/1 as amended at the meeting, except for the representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who undertook to present the amended directive to the Director of F.B.I. for further consideration (amended directive subsequently circulated as the Enclosure to C.I.G. 12/2).
- b. Agreed with the Director of Central Intelligence that:
 - (1) If the Director of the F.B.I. concurred in the Enclosure, it would be issued forthwith as a directive.
 - (2) If the Director of the F.B.I. did not concur in the Enclosure, the Intelligence Advisory Board would meet again to discuss submitting this matter to the National Intelligence Authority for decision.
- c. Noted the interpretation of the procedures to be followed under the proposed directive as developed in discussion at the meeting.

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I.A.B. 7th Meeting

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in Room 2169
New War Department Building
on Monday, 26 August 1946, at 2:30 p.m.

1. EXPLOITATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS CONCERNS, NON-GOVERN-
MENTAL GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS WITH CONNECTIONS ABROAD
AS SOURCES OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
(C.I.G. 12/1)

For consideration of the recommendations contained in
C.I.G. 12/1.

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IAB 7th Meeting

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COPY NO. _____

I.A.B. 8th MeetingCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPINTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARDAGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in Room 2169
New War Department Building
on Tuesday, 1 October 1946, at 2:30 p.m.

1. EXPLOITATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS CONCERNS, NON-GOVERNMENTAL GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS WITH CONNECTIONS ABROAD AS SOURCES OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.
 (C.I.G. 12/2)

Oral report by the Director of Central Intelligence of discussion with F.B.I. subsequent to last I.A.B. meeting.

2. POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP.
 (C.I.G. Directive No.. 8)

Oral report by the Director of Central Intelligence on security clearance of personnel for duties with C.I.G.

- ③ 3. ASSIGNMENT OF FUNCTIONS IN THE FIELD OF STATIC INTELLIGENCE TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP.
 (C.I.G. 13)

For consideration of the proposal submitted by the Chief of Naval Intelligence contained in C.I.G. 13.

4. WAR PLANS FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP.
 (C.I.G. 14)

For consideration of the proposal submitted by the Chief of Naval Intelligence contained in C.I.G. 14.

- ⑤ 5. ESTABLISHMENT OF A CHANNEL BETWEEN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.
 (C.I.G. 15)

For consideration of the problems presented in C.I.G. 15.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

Secretary, N.I.A.

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I.A.B. 8th Meeting

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD


Minutes of Meeting held in Room 2169
New War Department Building
on Tuesday, 1 October 1946, at 2:30 P.M.

Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of
Central Intelligence, in the Chair

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State for Research and In-
telligence
Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director
of Intelligence, W.D.G.S.
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval
Intelligence
Brig. General John A. Samford, Deputy Assistant
Chief of Air Staff-2

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. A. Sidney Buford, Department of State
Colonel E. J. Treacy, U.S.A.
Captain R. K. Davis, U.S.N.
Colonel E. P. Mussett, U.S.A.
 Central Intelligence
(only)
al Intelligence Group

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SECRETARIAT

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, N.I.A.
Mr. John S. Earman, Assistant Secretary, N.I.A.

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IAB 8th Meeting

S E C R E T

1. EXPLOITATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS CONCERNS, NON-GOVERNMENTAL GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS WITH CONNECTIONS ABROAD AS SOURCES OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
 (C.I.G. 12/2)

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that subsequent to the last I.A.B. meeting he had conferred with Mr. Hoover of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. After discussing C.I.G. 12/2, Mr. Hoover agreed with the paper provided some changes were made. It appeared that Mr. Hoover's chief objection to C.I.G. 12/2 was exploitation by C.I.G. of subversive groups which the F.B.I. might be contacting or investigating.

ADMIRAL INGLIS asked specifically what changes had been made in C.I.G. 12/2.

GENERAL VANDENBERG explained the changes and stated that he was willing to go along with the paper, as amended, since he was fully in accord with Mr. Hoover's viewpoint.

ADMIRAL INGLIS questioned the phrasing of paragraph 2 of C.I.G. 12/2, and particularly that part thereof which reads "and American residents travelling abroad". He suggested that consideration be given to clarifying that phrase.

ADMIRAL INGLIS then brought up the question of whether or not the changes in this paper would preclude O.N.I. from contacting "hyphenated" groups and individuals.

GENERAL VANDENBERG replied that it would not, since such individuals and groups were not mentioned in the paper at all and there was no effect whatsoever.

ADMIRAL INGLIS suggested, and it was agreed, that an understanding to that effect appear in the minutes.

MR. LAY read an interpretation of the intent of paragraph 3-b, which was accepted.

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

✓ a. Concurred in the revision of C.I.G. 12/2 (subsequently issued as C.I.G. Directive No. 15).

✓ b. Noted that the revision of C.I.G. 12/2 eliminated provisions for coordination of the exploitation of other non-governmental groups and individuals not specifically mentioned therein.

c. Agreed on the following interpretation of the intent of paragraph 3-b of the revision of C.I.G. 12/2:

(1) That O.N.I. would not submit a name for inclusion in the C.I.G. Contact Register unless agreeable to the individual.

(2) That it would not be possible for O.N.I. at this time to canvass the some 25,000 individuals whose names are now held in the O.N.I. Contact Register with respect to gaining their assent for listing in the C.I.G. Contact Register.

(3) (a) That before approaching new contacts, clearance would be obtained from the Contact Register of C.I.G. to avoid duplication, and when approached after clearance, permission of the prospect would be requested as diplomatically as possible before entering his name in the Contact Register of C.I.G. If agreeable, such name would be furnished to the C.I.G. Contact Register.

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(b) That as old contacts are renewed, the same permission will be requested as diplomatically as possible, and if agreeable to the individual, the name would be furnished to the C.I.G. Contact Register.

(4) That O.N.I. will retain a contact whether or not the individual agrees to having his name listed in the C.I.G. Contact Register,

2. POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
(C.I.G. Directive No. 8)

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that C.I.G. Directive No. 8 was based upon the arrangement existing at that time under which departments assigned personnel to C.I.G. The departments, therefore, assumed the responsibility for conducting necessary security investigations. He further stated that two developments had made this Directive out of date. First, it is clear that in the future the majority of C.I.G. personnel must be recruited from sources other than the departments. Second, the War Department finds it impossible to carry out the necessary investigations because of reduced personnel ceiling. As a result of these facts it will be necessary for C.I.G. to assume responsibility for all future security investigations required to clear its personnel. In conducting these security investigations, C.I.G. will adhere to the same security standards as established in this Directive and will, of course, check with the departments in each case. General Vandenberg assumed that when the departments nominate individuals in the future for C.I.G., the nominating department has at least made a preliminary check on its own files to determine that the individual meets C.I.G.'s security standards. General Vandenberg also assumed that the departments will complete all investigations initiated up to this time.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that the War Department could check records on any new personnel nominations to C.I.G. and also that those checks they have started can be completed. However, that was about as far as he could go, in view of the greatly restricted personnel ceiling and tremendous backlog of requested checks now on hand.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that the Navy Department could also give a quick check on any personnel nominations they might make to C.I.G., but that the Navy Department too was suffering from reduced personnel and also had a large number of requested checks on hand. Admiral Inglis further stated that he believed that C.I.G. should in some way be covered to take care of the type of individual who did not pass a full security check but whose services would be of value to the Central Intelligence Group.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN suggested that exemption in these cases should be made by the Director of Central Intelligence.

GENERAL VANDENBERG agreed that provision for such exemptions would be made.

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

a. Concurred in the proposal by General Vandenberg that C.I.G. undertake responsibility for all future security investigations required to clear its personnel, subject to the same security standards as established in C.I.G. Directive No. 8 except for exemptions authorized by the Director of Central Intelligence. (Revision of C.I.G. Directive No. 8 subsequently circulated.)

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3. ASSIGNMENT OF FUNCTIONS IN THE FIELD OF STATIC INTELLIGENCE TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP (C.I.G. 13)

GENERAL VANDENBERG noted that the C.I.G. has already given consideration to this problem and its broad implications. Inter-departmental discussions on coordination, allocation, and centralization are being held under C.I.G. auspices. However, these discussions have indicated the need for an early I.A.B. or N.I.A. decision regarding the broad basis on which the assignment of primary responsibilities should be considered, and how each agency of secondary interest will have its needs for finished intelligence met.

MR. EDDY asked what was meant by the term "static intelligence".

ADMIRAL INGLIS explained that it involved roughly the field covered by JANIS studies.

GENERAL VANDENBERG considered that it involved gathering a large mass of data and then preparing a basic study which would be of use to many agencies. He explained that political matters of a more or less permanent nature were included, such as the constitution of the country and the form of government if this was fairly stable.

MR. EDDY felt that political and economic matters were at the present time in a state of change throughout a large part of the world. He said that the State Department did not object to coordination of these fields, but was not willing to turn over to C.I.G. the responsibility for getting this intelligence. That responsibility must remain in the State Department.

ADMIRAL INGLIS explained that O.N.I. must retain an interest in political and economic matters as they affect naval affairs. He did not think that naval and military attaches should be blind to political and economic developments. The subject paper, however, was not concerned with the problem of collection. Admiral Inglis explained that the War and Navy Departments had been studying what functions and activities could be performed jointly. It was useless, however, for these departments to make any joint arrangement if C.I.G. proposed to take over various functions and activities. The purpose of the subject paper was to initiate a study to find out what C.I.G. planned to do. He explained that the JANIS studies were used only as an example of the fields involved, but not as an example of the procedures to be used. The subject paper contemplated the possibility of turning over to C.I.G. people in the various agencies working on geographical desks who prepared material which is edited by the JANIS Board. Admiral Inglis stated that the paper was not confined to the subject of JANIS studies.

MR. EDGAR stated that the question raised by C.I.G. could be explained as follows: If political intelligence, in which O.N.I. has an interest, is allocated to the agency of primary interest, would O.N.I. expect to receive this intelligence directly from the primary agency in proper form, or would O.N.I. have a group to put it into form, or would O.N.I. expect C.I.G. to do that?

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GENERAL VANDENBERG said that C.I.G. desired an expression of opinion from the I.A.B. as to whether they would like C.I.G. to operate as a middleman between departments, or if they would like direct contact between departments with C.I.G. in a coordinating role. He explained that if C.I.G. was to take over the preparation of static or strategic intelligence studies, C.I.G. would either have to receive the intelligence from the departments as JANIS now does, or would have to take over the people in the agencies who are now preparing this intelligence.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN felt that it was clear that certain departments were responsible for certain elements of intelligence, although this had never been put in the form of a written statement, to his knowledge. He wondered if it wasn't possible for C.I.G. and the departments to parcel out functions on the basis of primary responsibility. Then each department would furnish finished intelligence to other departments who could rework it to meet their particular needs.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that the question involved in such a plan was whether C.I.G. should operate in the middle between departments or on the side.

GENERAL SAMFORD stated that he voted for C.I.G. in the middle position.

MR. EDGAR said that a further question was whether the required intelligence should be written in proper form by the agency of primary responsibility, or by C.I.G.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN felt that another solution was preferable. This was that the proper function of C.I.G. should be to obtain intelligence from all departments and put it in the best form for the use of all departments.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that it was hard to have the intelligence put in the form required by any single department. For example, it would be difficult to get people in State to put intelligence in final form for use by the War Department.

CAPTAIN DAVIS said that the subject paper suggested a study of the possibility of placing C.I.G. in the middle role.

MR. EDDY said that the problems facing the various departments were different. He thought that most of the intelligence now produced in the War and Navy Departments was for potential use in case of active operations. Political operations, however, are going on day by day, and the State Department has to produce intelligence for those current operations. He said that he would be glad to have State's product sent to C.I.G. and integrated with similar intelligence from the War and Navy Departments.

GENERAL VANDENBERG pointed out that the economic intelligence produced by State did not cover all of the needs in that field of the War and Navy Departments.

GENERAL SAMFORD said that what each intelligence agency does stems from what its chief wants done. He felt that with C.I.G. in the middle role, the agencies would find that C.I.G. could do completely many of the things they required, and would eventually find that it was best to rely on C.I.G.

MR. EDDY said that he would like to feel that C.I.G. would send to State the military and naval intelligence required by the diplomats.

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GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that if G-2 had an insight into State's needs, G-2 could incorporate those needs into its documents. If all agencies sat down with C.I.G. to find each others' needs, each agency could produce documents containing all the essential elements in its field of primary responsibility that any other agency needed to extract and pass to its operating officials.

MR. EDGAR felt that would mean that C.I.G. would devise a format of a national intelligence handbook to meet the individual requirements of each of the agencies.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that was not quite what he intended. Rather, if C.I.G. would find out what military intelligence State needs, then C.I.G. could arrange that G-2 include these needs in its documents.

GENERAL VANDENBERG felt that a further step was involved. He thought that General Chamberlin was talking about weekly and daily reports, whereas the subject paper was concerned with the preparation of basic handbooks for use by all agencies. The question was whether C.I.G. should produce these handbooks, or ask each agency to produce appropriate sections of them.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he preferred the latter arrangement. He noted, however, that the present JANIS covers only a part of the basic intelligence required.

ADMIRAL INGLIS enumerated the following fields which he felt should be studied by the committee proposed in the basic paper:

1. Establishment of elements which are susceptible of operation by C.I.G.
2. Proposed organization for the operation of such elements by C.I.G.
3. Space requirements.
4. A time schedule for the steps involved in taking over by C.I.G.
5. Standard filing system and central library, standard report form, and form for intelligence directives.
6. Method for responding to urgent requests.

GENERAL SAMFORD felt that each agency should retain its own group to prepare reports, but that the basic material would be easier to work on if it were integrated by C.I.G.

ADMIRAL INGLIS thought that each agency should retain responsibility for operational intelligence and for collection and dissemination. He felt the place that C.I.G. could be of most help would be in the processing required between collection and dissemination. He felt that each agency must retain a staff to disseminate and to put material into the final form desired by its customers. He thought that each agency should assist in obtaining the basic intelligence information for C.I.G.

MR. EDDY and GENERAL SAMFORD said that they were in favor of the proposal as described by Admiral Inglis.

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GENERAL CHAMBERLIN felt that one other element must be retained in the departments, namely, that the intelligence officers must always be able to give their commanders an independent judgment.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that this was possible if the intelligence produced by departments was based on the same source but differently oriented.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that each agency should not be excluded from getting information through their field representatives on subjects outside of the field of its primary interest.

GENERAL SAMFORD agreed that each agency should be able to exploit all sources available to it.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN reiterated that it was necessary for each agency to retain independence of judgment.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that this should be satisfied by each agency having its own people in C.I.G. He felt strongly that when naval officers were assigned to C.I.G. they were still naval officers and responsible for seeing that C.I.G. gets all necessary naval information and that the Navy gets all C.I.G. intelligence of interest to it.

GENERAL VANDENBERG added that naval officers in C.I.G. should also ensure that C.I.G. estimates have the proper naval slant.

ADMIRAL INGLIS felt that if this was understood, the concern of each intelligence head regarding responsibility to his chief, was largely obviated.

MR. EDDY said that State would be willing to cooperate if C.I.G. produced documents the use of which was permissible but not mandatory. If the subject proposal, however, lead to referring State Department requests to C.I.G. for preparation, he felt this would be a dangerous practice.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that one of the problems is that, if personnel is turned over to C.I.G. and the departmental agencies accept this reduction of their force, they must be assured of the quick service required by their departments.

MR. EDGAR noted a further step in that, if the primary responsibility is allocated to another agency, C.I.G. will have to arrange that the latter agency meets requirements on time.

MR. EDDY reiterated that each agency must retain responsibility for intelligence of primary interest. What is passed to C.I.G. will involve material of secondary interest to the various agencies.

GENERAL SAMFORD agreed that all agencies must still concentrate on intelligence of primary interest.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that G-2 does not handle operational intelligence, but is concerned solely with strategic intelligence.

ADMIRAL INGLIS agreed that this was also true of O.N.I., except that it must retain a skeleton force for mobilization in case of active operations.

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GENERAL CHAMBERLIN felt that the solution lies along both lines suggested. Certain activities must be performed in the departments and other activities should be done centrally when they are of common interest and can be more efficiently handled centrally. He did not think that the I.A.B. could give definite guidance one way or the other. He felt that each case must be studied separately.

ADMIRAL INGLIS agreed that the problem could not be solved at this time, but that a committee must be formed to break the problem down into its various elements.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that he would ask for nominations for such a committee in the next few days. He explained that the purpose of this discussion was to have Mr. Edgar hear the viewpoints of the I.A.B. members so that he could guide the committee's discussions.

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Noted that the Director of Central Intelligence would ask for nominations for a committee to conduct the study proposed in C.I.G. 13.

4. WAR PLANS FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP.
(C.I.G. 14)

GENERAL VANDENBERG noted the recommendations in C.I.G. 14 and stated that as a general principle he firmly believed that the personnel requirements of the C.I.G. should be as fully mobilized in peace as in war. On that basis he stated that he would furnish the War and Navy Departments with an estimate of C.I.G. personnel requirements based on present planning, taking into account the probable number of Reserve officers assigned to C.I.G. He stated, however, that at C.I.G.'s present stage of organization any such estimates should be considered tentative and subject to substantial revision as the organization develops.

ADMIRAL INGLIS agreed that all C.I.G. personnel figures to be submitted at the present time could only be estimates. However, he wanted to be sure that all Regular Line officers assigned to C.I.G. would not be frozen in case of an emergency. He stated that he felt that the Navy Department should have some assurance that the Regular and Reserve Line officers assigned to C.I.G. would either be retained in toto or that a certain number of them would be released to the Navy for sea duty.

GENERAL VANDENBERG agreed to give the Navy this information, and that such information would be based on the best possible estimation.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that the War Department would like to have the same estimate on both Regular and Reserve Army officers assigned to C.I.G.

MR. LAY stated that C.I.G. had already received such a request and that a reply was being prepared.

MR. EDDY asked if C.I.G. would try to protect civilians assigned to C.I.G. in case of an emergency, in order that their services would not be lost.

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GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that these civilians would be protected unless they would be of more service to the Government elsewhere.

MR. EDDY brought out the point that he believed that the civilians in C.I.G. would generally feel that they should be in uniform. He suggested that provision be made for retaining C.I.G. civilian personnel in time of war.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that this involved a much longer range problem and should, in his opinion, be considered at a later date.

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Noted that the Director of Central Intelligence would furnish to the War and Navy Departments estimates of C.I.G. military and naval personnel requirements in case of mobilization.

5. ESTABLISHMENT OF A CHANNEL BETWEEN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
(C.I.G. 15)

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that Admiral Inglis had raised the question of the relationship between C.I.G. and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a result of this, C.I.G. has prepared a proposed directive on the subject, which he believed had been seen by all I.A.B. members. General Vandenberg further stated that it was his understanding, as a result of informal discussions in the departments by members of the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff, that this proposed directive was generally acceptable to the I.A.B., and he therefore recommended concurrence in its submittal to the N.I.A. and the J.C.S.

ADMIRAL INGLIS and GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that this paper as written was not entirely acceptable.

MR. LAY stated that it was his understanding that members of ICAPS had coordinated this paper with representatives of the intelligence agencies of the State, War, and Navy Departments.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that he was afraid the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be embarrassed if N.I.A. approved this proposal prior to the J.C.S. having a chance to comment.

MR. LAY said that this was merely an attempt to find an appropriate recommendation for a solution to the problem. He also said that this paper, if acceptable to the J.I.C., could be submitted by them to the J.C.S. prior to N.I.A.'s consideration.

ADMIRAL INGLIS explained that this problem had been brought up by a J.I.S. request for information on nuclear energy, which had been prepared without knowledge of the fact that C.I.G. was also working on this problem. His original proposal, that J.I.S. serve as a staff for the I.A.B., was intended to offer an immediate interim means for coordinating C.I.G. and J.I.C. activities.

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GENERAL VANDENBERG felt that we should go the whole way if an acceptable final solution could be found. He felt that it might even be desirable for him as an intelligence representative to sit in on J.C.S. meetings as a non-voting member in order to learn what areas of the world were being worked on.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that he had the following changes to suggest in the C.I.G. paper: He had no objection to having the Director of Central Intelligence as a member of the J.I.C., but he did not think that any one individual should be designated as chief intelligence adviser to the J.C.S.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that for his protection he wanted some assurance that, if he served both the N.I.A. and the J.C.S., it was clear that only one of them was his master.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN pointed out that the difficulty was that the Joint Chiefs of Staff must be assured that their priorities are met. He thought that they would therefore wish to retain an intelligence organization under their control.

MR. EDDY suggested a modification of Admiral Inglis' proposal whereby the J.I.S. would formulate J.C.S. requirements for intelligence and would transmit them to C.I.G. for compilation. In this way the J.I.S. would serve more as a secretariat, and the intelligence would be produced by C.I.G.

GENERAL SAMFORD noted that this would retain the J.I.S., who could then fulfill J.C.S. requirements if C.I.G. was unable to give them the necessary priority.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN questioned whether this would be acceptable to the planners, since he wondered whether they would be willing to let an outside agency in on their plans. He stated that the J.I.C. even now was still working on the problem of persuading the planners to let the intelligence people in on their plans.

GENERAL VANDENBERG suggested that this problem be deferred pending further study.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN agreed, and said that he would like to discuss it with General Eisenhower.

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Deferred action on C.I.G. 15.

SECRETI.A.B. 14th MeetingCOPY NO. 36INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARDAGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in Room 7117
North Interior Building
on Thursday, 17 July 1947 at 2:30 P. M.

1. ACTION BY THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD ON MATTERS
SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY
(CIG 24, CIG 24/1 and Minutes of 13th IAB Meeting)

For consideration of the recommendations contained in
CIG 24 and CIG 24/1.

2. AMENDMENT OF THE DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC AND NATIONAL
POLICY INTELLIGENCE
(IAB 2, and Minutes of 13th IAB Meeting)

For consideration of the recommendations contained in
IAB 2.

3. EMPLOYMENT OF RESERVE OFFICERS AS AGENTS
(IAB 3 and IAB 3/1, the latter to be circulated)

For consideration of the recommendations contained in
IAB 3. and ~~IAB 3/1~~

4. CIG REPRESENTATION ON U.S. GOVERNMENT MISSIONS ABROAD
(IAB 4)

For consideration of the recommendations contained in
IAB 4.

J. S. EARMAN

Secretary, N.I.A.

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SECRETI.A.B. 14th MeetingCOPY NO. 35INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 7117
North Interior Building
on Thursday, 17 July 1947 at 2:30 P.M.

Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, Director
of Central Intelligence, in the Chair

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to
the Secretary of State for Research
and Intelligence
Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin,
Director of Intelligence, WDGS
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of
Naval Intelligence
Maj. General George C. McDonald, Assistant
Chief of Air Staff-2

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. Donald Edgar, Central Intelligence
Group
Mr. Park Armstrong, Department of State
Colonel Riley F. Ennis, WDGS
Capt. R. K. Davis, USN
Lt. Colonel Edgar J. Treacy, WDGS
Major W. C. Baird, AAF-2

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Mr. J. S. Earman, Secretary, N.I.A.

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SECRETI.A.B. 14th Meeting1. EMPLOYMENT OF RESERVE OFFICERS AS AGENTS
(IAB 3 and IAB 3/1)

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE opened the meeting with the statement that he wished to add the following to the last sentence of paragraph 5 of the Enclosure to IAB 3/1 "except those employed by CIG" since CIG was presently employing Army and Naval Reserve officers as agents in a full time capacity.

GENERAL McDONALD stated he was inclined to believe that the provisions of IAB 3 were too restrictive. He said, for example, the Army Air Forces have contracts with institutions, some of whose employees are Reserve Officers, and pointed out that recently it was necessary for such an employee to go to Europe in a civilian and overt capacity in performance of duties assigned to him by his civilian employer. General McDonald further stated that he believed that instances of this nature were likely to occur many times.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that cases of the nature indicated by General McDonald brought out the fact that the Intelligence Advisory Board should have a coordinated policy on the employment of individuals as intelligence agents in an overt capacity since agreement had already been reached that CIG will have jurisdiction and cognizance over covert intelligence collection, and while he was not necessarily championing any particular ground rules he did think there should be a common understanding as to whether or not ground rules were necessary. He went on to state that if it were necessary for such an individual to go overseas as an agent of a department or an institution other than CIG and was not a part of CIG's organized operations, he felt that such action should be coordinated or at least information given to CIG as to the identity of the individual.

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ADMIRAL INGLIS further stated that this was based on the assumption that such an individual was acting in a covert capacity. If the work of this individual were in the overt field and he were a Naval Reserve officer, Navy regulations required that he notify the Bureau of Personnel, Navy Department, prior to his departure, and further that he "check in" with the Naval Attache or Senior Naval Officer in each country visited. Admiral Inglis noted that CIG's position in this matter seemed to be quite logical and he accepted it without reservation.

GENERAL McDONALD stated he did not believe that the Army had any like requirements as outlined by Admiral Inglis, but Army Reserve officers often volunteered to pick up any information they could in their travels abroad.

ADMIRAL INGLIS noted that some embarrassment might be caused if a Reserve officer were "caught," since he could not divorce his identity with the services unless he had previously resigned his commission. However, it might conceivably be that the job he was performing was so important that he would resign his commission in order to take over a particular task.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN asked if the problem presented in IAB 3 was purely from a covert viewpoint.

ADMIRAL INGLIS replied that the problem was centered on the covert. Presumably when a naval Reserve officer acted as an overt representative of the State Department, for example, the Navy was ordinarily kept informed.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that he doubted the advisability of the conclusions of paragraph 5 a of IAB 3 since he believed that this paragraph stifled liberty of action. He went on to say he thought in covert intelligence the Central Intelligence Group should be able to hire the best man suitable for the job whether he was military or naval Reserve, and further that he did not think that the IAB should place any barriers that might be restrictive.

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ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that he did not think that covert methods should as a general rule be used if the same objectives could be accomplished by using overt methods. He noted that targets given covert personnel were those that could not be gained by overt means, and further that they were not hired because they were naval Reserve officers but rather on their ability to do the job.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that in his opinion there should be very little, if any, restrictions imposed on operations in the covert field.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that he was not quite in agreement that covert operations should have no restrictions and reiterated that if a Reserve officer of the Army, Navy or Air Forces were caught it would surely cause unfavorable publicity and embarrassment to his service.

After further discussion where it was brought out by the Director that CIG had exclusive organizational jurisdiction over operations in the clandestine field and that there could be no objection to the member IAB agencies employing casual agents

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Approved the conclusions in IAB 3 with the following exceptions:

Paragraph 5 a to be omitted.

Paragraph 5 b to be rewritten as follows:

"Members in the Reserve of one military service shall ordinarily not be employed as agents by, and then only after informing, the other service."

Paragraphs c and d to remain as written.

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2. ACTION BY THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
ON MATTERS SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY
(CIG 24 and CIG 24/1)

THE DIRECTOR stated the purpose of CIG 24 and CIG 24/1 was to formalize procedure on matters submitted to the National Intelligence Authority. He said he did not believe that the Director of Central Intelligence as a member of the National Intelligence Authority could correctly make the Intelligence Advisory Board, which was created solely for the purpose of advising the Director of Central Intelligence, privy to all matters presented to the National Intelligence Authority. He noted that in the last two months he had received calls from Admiral Leahy and Secretary Forrestal on matters that did not concern the coordination of intelligence. He further stated that up until the last N.I.A. meeting there had been no agenda published. However, prior to that meeting Secretary Forrestal requested that an agenda be published. An agenda was prepared and circulated to the member IAB agencies.

MR. EDDY stated that the State Department was wholly in agreement with CIG 24/1 with the exception of two changes, one of which was substantive and the other one of clarification, the substantive change being that on matters involving the request for personnel or facilities by CIG to the member agencies that such requests should be submitted to the IAB in writing prior to submission to the N.I.A.

In this connection Mr. Eddy noted that the President's letter of 22 January 1946 stated in part that full use shall be made by the Director of Central Intelligence of the staff and facilities of the member IAB agencies.

THE DIRECTOR read paragraphs 3 a, b and c of the above-mentioned letter.

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Upon being asked by the Director ADMIRAL INGLIS replied that he went along with the change recommended by Mr. Eddy, and further that he had a number of other exceptions as to the whole philosophy of CIG's position as set forth in the discussion of CIG 24/1. He said he took particular exception to the item in paragraph 1 of the recommendations in CIG 24/1, which stated: "The Director of Central Intelligence shall be the sole judge of the advisability of referring any proposed recommendation to a special studies group or for otherwise delaying the submission of the recommendation to the National Intelligence Authority."

THE DIRECTOR stated that he believed that item was a result of the delays in receiving recommendations from ad hoc committees appointed by the Intelligence Advisory Board.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated he also took exception to that part of CIG 24/1 which required the IAB to submit any desired statement of non-concurrence in one week.

THE DIRECTOR stated that he was often limited in time in the preparation of replies to other agencies and cited for an example the urgent request of the Atomic Energy Commission for comments of the National Intelligence Authority on the proposed intelligence organization within the Atomic Energy Commission.

ADMIRAL INGLIS noted that in reality any paper sent to the Intelligence Advisory Board for consideration could not be answered by "yes" or "no."

GENERAL McDONALD stated it was his opinion that by allowing a week and in some cases less for consideration of a paper the work was being taken out of the hands of the intelligence staffs and was being performed by the members of the IAB.

THE DIRECTOR stated he agreed with General McDonald but he still felt there should be some time limitation set on papers circulated to the IAB for comment.

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ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that in cases where urgency was of the essence, if a statement to that effect were indicated he would do all in his power to return his comments in the time allotted. Admiral Inglis went on to state that Secretary Forrestal had told him that he expected the IAB to thresh out and reconcile their differences on papers before they were submitted to the N.I.A., and further that Mr. Forrestal did not like the recent procedure of submitting recommendations to the N.I.A. without having such recommendations discussed by the intelligence chiefs of that Authority. Admiral Inglis said, however, he recognized that the Director of Central Intelligence had encountered from time to time inordinate delays in IAB handling of papers and he sympathized with the desire to reduce such delays.

ADMIRAL INGLIS also stated that it was his opinion that paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1 did not restrict the matters which are referred to the IAB to matters related to coordination. Admiral Inglis said he was also not in agreement with paragraph 4 of the discussion in CIG 24/1, which read: "Recommendations requested of the Director of Central Intelligence by the National Intelligence Authority are not considered as falling into the pattern provided in N.I.A. Directive No. 1, paragraph 3, nor is it considered that it was the intent of the President or of the National Intelligence Authority that all reports, papers, and statements prepared by the Director of Central Intelligence for presentation to the National Intelligence Authority be first submitted to the Intelligence Advisory Board for advisory opinion" since a great deal depended upon the subject matter presented to the N.I.A.

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THE DIRECTOR stated that he agreed with Admiral Inglis and suggested that the word "all" precede the word "recommendations" in the beginning of the above-quoted paragraph.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated since the Director of Central Intelligence was a non-voting member of the National Intelligence Authority, it was his opinion that this fact gave a different implication to the statement contained in CIG 24/1 that "The Director of Central Intelligence as a member of the National Intelligence Authority can not correctly make the Intelligence Advisory Board, which was created solely for the purpose of advising him, privy to all matters before the National Intelligence Authority." He went on to state that he certainly assumed from the reasoning behind the organization of the Intelligence Advisory Board that that Board should be privy to practically all matters going to the National Intelligence Authority.

THE DIRECTOR stated he agreed with the viewpoint of Admiral Inglis that practically all matters presented to the National Intelligence Authority should have had prior discussion by the Intelligence Advisory Board. He noted, however, that it would be difficult to define in advance those matters which should go to the National Intelligence Authority without previous IAB discussion.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated with reference to the preparation and circulation of formalized agenda for NIA meetings that it was Mr. Forrestal's desire that agenda should be prepared by the Secretary, N.I.A., and items thereon discussed by the IAB prior to their discussion by the N.I.A.

MR. EDDY noted that even if formalized agenda for N.I.A. meetings were prepared that the Intelligence Advisory Board could not expect that the N.I.A. would not discuss other matters than those appearing on the agenda, if they so desired.

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ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that it was not the intent that the National Intelligence Authority could not discuss any matter they saw fit. However, he was advocating that the Intelligence Advisory Board use the same procedure as used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, i.e., that all matters be thoroughly discussed and differences reconciled on the working level prior to submission to a higher authority.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that he was in agreement with Admiral Inglis that there should be an agenda prepared for N.I.A. meetings, and further if the N.I.A. chooses to bring up items other than those appearing on the agenda that was, of course, their prerogative.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that it was his opinion that the provisions of the last three sentences under the discussion in CIG 24/1 were unsound, and further that neither the Director of Central Intelligence nor any other lone member of the Intelligence Advisory Board could nullify the desires of all other members in sending any paper to the National Intelligence Authority. He pointed out that he did not believe it was practicable to require the head of one of the intelligence agencies to go through his secretary in order to get a paper to the National Intelligence Authority, and further that such a practice was not fair to the members of the N.I.A., not to have the advice of the Intelligence Advisory Board. He also said it was his opinion that the logical and practical way to submit papers to the N.I.A. was through the IAB with the recommendations, if any, of the members of the IAB appended to such papers in the event agreement could not be reached. Admiral Inglis went on to say that this procedure was followed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and any other way seemed irregular to him.

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MR. EDGAR stated that the N.I.A. and the IAB were not comparable to the JCS and JIC. The JCS has a committee where the N.I.A. has a Director of Central Intelligence who is an individual responsible for certain activities and the IAB is merely advisory to him.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that he did not agree that the IAB was merely advisory to the Director of Central Intelligence and further it was not intended in the philosophy that established the IAB.

MR. EDGAR said that the title of the IAB indicated that it was in fact an advisory body.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that he did not believe this was the concept. He said the IAB, in addition to being an advisory body, is also an implementing body, and further the IAB is a liaison channel between the Director of Central Intelligence and the member agencies. It also permits the heads of the intelligence services themselves to implement and take special personal interest in the work of the CIG. He pointed out that the IAB was intended to make the heads of intelligence services share the responsibility of the success of CIG and in sharing this responsibility the members of the IAB must have a certain amount of authority.

MR. EDDY stated it appeared to him that to send a paper to the N.I.A. without the concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and the majority of the members of the IAB would be expecting a lot of the N.I.A.

ADMIRAL INGLIS thought that any member of the IAB who filed a paper should get the concurrence of not less than one other member. However, if it was desired to adjust this to a majority, that was a compromise, and that he did not feel too strongly one way or the other.

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GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that he thought the IAB might approach the overall question better if CIG 24 and CIG 24/1 were withdrawn and a complete new paper prepared. He went on to state that he objected to CIG 24/1 somewhat along the lines of Admiral Inglis. He said he agreed perfectly with Admiral Inglis that the IAB was a little more than an advisory body and further that the idea that the IAB had authority to commit their own departments to action could be justified. He went on to state that the success of intelligence in the government is dependent entirely on cooperation. He said that the above was a general summary of his feeling. However, he had other objections in detail and believed that time could be saved by appointing an ad hoc committee to redraft a new paper.

MR. EDDY stated that he would agree to the appointment of an ad hoc committee to redraft a new paper. However, he believed that a close examination of the recommendations contained in CIG 24/1 left nothing to be desired, and further that he hoped that the ad hoc committee, if appointed, could start with these recommendations and see how they could be amended. He went on to say he did not find much in the recommendations which would not be acceptable to him.

GENERAL McDONALD, upon being asked by the Director, agreed to the appointment of the ad hoc committee mentioned above.

ADMIRAL INGLIS asked Mr. Eddy whether the ad hoc committee in drawing up a new paper should restrict itself to the recommendations contained in CIG 24/1.

MR. EDDY replied that he hoped that they would consider the recommendations and that in the main these recommendations could form a basis for the new paper.

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After some discussion where it was noted by Admiral Inglis that he felt that the IAB should have a staff as did the JIC,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Agreed to appoint an ad hoc committee to submit a new paper on the subject of action by the Intelligence Advisory Board on matters submitted to the National Intelligence Authority, the committee to consist of Mr. Edgar, Mr. Armstrong, Lt. Col. Treacy, Capt. Davis and Col. Mussett.

3. AMENDMENT OF THE DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC AND NATIONAL POLICY INTELLIGENCE
(IAB 2)

THE DIRECTOR stated that the phrase "strategic and national policy intelligence" had its origin in a memorandum from General Donovan to the President dated 18 November 1944. Therein General Donovan distinguished between intelligence pertaining primarily to departmental action and intelligence material required by the Executive Branch in planning and carrying out the national policy and strategy. General Donovan went on to say in this memorandum that while recognizing that production of the former must remain decentralized, he contended for centralization with respect to the latter. He proposed as one of the functions of the central intelligence agency the "final evaluation, synthesis, and dissemination within the government of intelligence required to enable the government to determine policies with respect to national planning and security in peace and war and the advancement of broad national policy." The Director went on to say that in a counter proposal prepared by the JIS the above passage was revised and stated that

"Accomplish the synthesis of departmental intelligence relating to the national security and the appropriate strategic and national policy intelligence."

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This counter proposal was in turn carried over into the President's letter of 22 January 1946 with the substitution of "correlation and evaluation" for "synthesis" and the deletion of "departmental." The Director said that Admiral Souers attributed the first change to the mere preference of Latin to Greek. The second was intended to deemphasize the idea of dependence on departmental agencies. A new sentence was added to require their full (but not exclusive) use. The Director said the JIS draft, which served eventually as the basis of the President's letter, was based on the following concepts:

- a. That each department would continue to produce the intelligence required to meet its own operating needs (i.e. pertaining primarily to departmental action).
- b. That such intelligence was inadequate as a basis for national strategy and policy (i.e. for decisions transcending the responsibilities of any particular department).
- c. That a central agency free of departmental bias was required to provide, through evaluation and synthesis, the intelligence required as a basis for such decisions.

THE DIRECTOR said that from the beginning strategic and national policy intelligence was conceived to be one thing, not two. Strategic was used in view of the emphasis upon relation to national security and because it was anticipated that the central organization would supersede the JIC in the realm of overall national strategy. National policy was used to broaden the implications of strategic to exclude, on the one hand, such matters of operational strategy as purely military plans for the seizure of Okinawa, and to include on the other

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considerations of a policy nature. The phrase, as a whole, was intended to describe that politico-military area of concern to the State, War and Navy Departments transcending the exclusive competence of any of them.

MR. EDDY stated that he preferred the original definition as approved by the N.I.A.

GENERAL McDONALD stated that he believed that the counter proposal submitted by the Navy on the definition in question was on the right track and that he had a proposal to go along with it. General McDonald said he thought the last sentence of the Navy definition might be modified to read as follows:

"It is political-economic-military in scope including such strategic data, as is necessary, of common concern at least to one military and one non-military agency."

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that he thought operational intelligence had to be reserved to the military, if it was military, and if diplomatic to the State Department.

MR. EDGAR stated that he thought the definition of staff intelligence clearly indicated that anything that would be called operational would come under staff intelligence rather than under national intelligence.

CAPTAIN DAVIS said he questioned Mr. Edgar's remark. He said it had been mentioned a number of times in discussions at other IAB meetings that CIG had no jurisdiction over operational intelligence. He went on to say that CIG no doubt did some operational intelligence but it was necessary for the military to keep control over their own operational intelligence. He said that nowhere did he find in writing or in the laws drafted in relation to CIG that exception, and it seemed to him that such should be put in writing.

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ADMIRAL INGLIS stated if it could be worked in somewhere "that intelligence which is necessary for their operations" and if there could be an understanding that strategic and national policy intelligence "must transcend the exclusive competence of both War and Navy Departments or any other Department thereafter that may arise from unification," then he was agreeable to the definition of strategic and national policy intelligence as written. Admiral Inglis went on to say that he thought this matter could be settled by writing into the minutes or having a memorandum prepared that the meaning of the definition was justified by implication since it included the words "political-economic-military," and further that it must transcend the exclusive competence of any one department or of the Army and Navy Departments together.

MR. EDDY asked whether the IAB could be sure that the JCS were not going to call on CIG for basic intelligence related to military and naval problems. He noted that the JIC already goes out of the chain of command for required intelligence information.

ADMIRAL INGLIS replied that it would be hard to give a "yes" or "no" answer.

MR. EDDY stated that although the IAB did not know the final form of the JIC, he had no objections to the above proposal of Admiral Inglis.

MR. EDGAR suggested that the IAB accept Admiral Inglis' proposal until such time as the JIC's future was determined and then, if necessary, again raise the question of the definition of strategic and national policy intelligence from the Army and Navy angle.

After some discussion, THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Agreed to Mr. Edgar's proposal.

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4. ATOMIC ENERGY INTELLIGENCE
(Memorandum for the National Intelligence Authority from U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, subject Atomic Energy Intelligence, dated July 7, 1947. /This memorandum was circulated to the individual members of the Intelligence Advisory Board ~~unnumbered~~.)

After a full discussion, THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Agreed that the Director of the proposed intelligence organization within the Atomic Energy Commission become a permanent member of the Intelligence Advisory Board, provided that such Director in becoming a permanent member would be subject to the provisions of the National Intelligence Authority.

5. TRANSFER OF NAVY JISPB PERSONNEL TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

After a brief discussion the Director agreed to the transfer to the Central Intelligence Group of the Navy Department's JISPB personnel as of 1 July 1947 provided the JIC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the transfer of the JANIS program to the Central Intelligence Group as previously recommended.

6. CIG REPRESENTATION ON U. S. GOVERNMENT MISSIONS ABROAD (IAB 4)

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Agreed to defer action on this paper until its next meeting.

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COPY NO. 33

I.A.B. 9th Meeting

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in Room 2169,
New War Department Building,
on Thursday, 31 October 1946, at 2:30 p.m.

1. INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES PREPARED BY THE CENTRAL INTELLI-
GENCE GROUP
(C.I.G. 16 and 16/1)

For consideration of the recommendations contained
in C.I.G. 16 and 16/1.

2. PLAN FOR COORDINATION OF BIOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE
(C.I.G. 17)

For consideration of the recommendation contained
in C.I.G. 17.

3. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS - CHINA
(To be circulated)

For consideration of a report on the above subject
which will be circulated prior to the meeting.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

Secretary, N.I.A.

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I.A.B. 9th Meeting

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPINTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 2169
New War Department Building
on Thursday, 31 October 1946, at 2:30 P.M.

Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of
Central Intelligence, in the Chair

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State for Research and In-
telligence
Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director
of Intelligence, W.D.G.S.
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval
Intelligence
Brig. General John A. Samford, Deputy Assistant
Chief of Air Staff -2

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. A. Sidney Buford, Department of State
Mr. James Heck, Department of State
Colonel E. K. Wright, Central Intelligence
Group (for Item 1 only)
Colonel E. J. Treacy, U.S.A.
Captain R. K. Davis, U.S.N.
Colonel E. P. Mussett, U.S.A.
Mr. Donald Edgar, Central Intelligence Group

SECRETARIAT

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, N.I.A.
Mr. John S. Earman, Assistant Secretary, N.I.A.

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~~TOP SECRET~~1. AGENDA AND WEEKLY DATE FOR I.A.B. MEETING

GENERAL VANDENBERG asked Mr. Lay to explain why there were three items left off the agenda of today's meeting.

MR. LAY stated that some of the I.A.B. members were not ready to discuss C.I.G. 13 and 15, and ICAPS was still working on C.I.G. 18.

MR. LAY then asked if it was agreeable with the Board to establish a standard time each week for I.A.B. meetings. He explained that in the event there was nothing to come before the Board, the members would be notified in advance and the meeting would be cancelled for that week.

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Agreed to set aside 1430 each Thursday as the normal time for I.A.B. meetings, with the understanding that the Secretary would advise each member early in the week whether a meeting was to be held.

2. INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES PREPARED BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
(C.I.G. 16 and C.I.G. 16/1)

GENERAL VANDENBERG asked Mr. Lay to give a brief explanation as to how ORE-1 was prepared and coordinated with the departments.

MR. LAY stated that C.I.G. was asked to prepare this estimate on Friday to be ready the following Tuesday. He also brought out the fact that the estimate was based on an existing J.I.S. study together with cables received from Moscow, and that it was coordinated with specialized representatives of the I.A.B. before going forward.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that he believed C.I.G. would have difficulty in meeting deadlines if the concurrence of each I.A.B. member had to be obtained by a voting system prior to the forwarding of the estimates.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that it was his idea to separate concurrences of estimates into three parts, i.e., the Daily Summary, the Weekly Summary, and formal O.R.E. estimates. He further stated that the Naval members of O.R.E. are perfectly competent to represent and concur for the Director of Naval Intelligence in the preparation of daily and weekly summaries. However, in the case of formal O.R.E. estimates, Admiral Inglis stated that he was in favor of using the J.I.C. vote method, time permitting, and that he would like to have two to three days to consider each paper. If time does not permit, he felt that the paper could be put through with a statement that the estimate does not bear the concurrence of the dissenting department but that such concurrence or comments would follow. Admiral Inglis further stated that while the relationship of J.I.S. to C.I.G. is not up for consideration at this time and is the subject of another paper, he believed its solution would go a long way in solving this present problem.

~~GENERAL SAMFORD~~ stated that A-2 would like the opportunity to comment on all estimates. He said that he realized that this procedure would be time-consuming, and believed possibly that an

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A-2 member of ICAPS could be designated to concur for A-2 on the estimates in question.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that an A-2 member of ICAPS could not be the person to be used by A-2 in concurring on these estimates, since ICAPS is concerned with coordination problems rather than the preparation or content of intelligence estimates.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that the Naval members of O.R.E. working on estimates would at all times be in collaboration with people in O.N.I., hence both O.N.I. and the Naval members of O.R.E. would be kept abreast of developments and the latter would know the Navy Department's views.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that the question regarding concurrence in the Daily Summary involves possible omissions which can distort the picture. He said that omissions had not happened lately, but he felt that General Vandenberg would be willing to let Naval members of O.R.E. complain to Admiral Inglis if they felt that omissions had occurred.

GENERAL VANDENBERG expressed the belief that the whole situation would be clarified when the I.A.B. considered C.I.G. 15.

MR. EDDY said that in the meantime he favored appointing an aide or a staff member as a representative in O.R.E. to check estimates as proposed in C.I.G. 16/1. His reason for favoring this solution, rather than C.I.G. 16, was that, although Army and Naval officers remain in uniform and loyal to their service, civilian employees are now becoming employees of C.I.G. rather than State. Former State Department employees in C.I.G. will therefore have no direct loyalties to State.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he was fundamentally opposed to considering a man assigned to C.I.G. as partially responsible to him. He felt that such a man owes his whole loyalty to C.I.G., and that it is impossible to divide his loyalties.

GENERAL SAMFORD thought that this was true except in ICAPS, where he felt there was a residual representation of departmental interests.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that he understood General Chamberlin's point of view, but he also understood that C.I.G. was to be a cooperative interdepartmental venture. He could see the difference in the situation regarding the State Department. However, in the case of Naval officers, while they were working in C.I.G. he felt they had an additional duty representing the Navy. If they felt that Navy's interests were not properly represented in C.I.G., then they should express this feeling to Admiral Inglis as their contact with the Navy Department. He reiterated that he understood General Chamberlin's viewpoint and granted that this situation may cause trouble in the future, but felt that there had been no difficulty so far.

MR. EDDY said that he thought Admiral Inglis' viewpoint would definitely cause trouble in the future, especially for the State Department.

ADMIRAL INGLIS expressed the understanding that there would always be a few people in C.I.G. who continued to be State Department employees, such as Mr. Huddle.

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MR. EDDY agreed that there would be a few key State Department positions in C.I.G., but these would carry on liaison with the State Department rather than be State Department representatives. He thought that this would encourage a closer relation with State, but expressed the belief that if one of these State Department people assigned to C.I.G. felt that State's interests were not properly represented, he would appeal not to the State Department, but to General Vandenberg.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN compared this to the situation on the General Staff, where personnel are expected to solve problems as they see it in the General Staff rather than from the viewpoint of the basic arm or service from which they come. He thought that if Admiral Inglis' interpretation prevailed, it would destroy C.I.G.

GENERAL VANDENBERG thought that the discussion led back to the solution proposed in C.I.G. 16/1.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN felt that General Vandenberg was appointed to head C.I.G. and that the I.A.B. were only advisers. He felt that General Vandenberg was placed here by the N.I.A. to perform functions assigned by that Authority. He did not feel that the I.A.B. should concern itself with the detailed performance of those functions. He said that General Vandenberg was responsible solely to the N.I.A. and was expected to consult with the departments only sufficiently to ensure coordination.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that the way the directive was written, the I.A.B. was more than an adviser. It is a two-way street and a link between C.I.G. and the departmental agencies. He felt that the I.A.B. had a responsibility for the operations of C.I.G.

✓ GENERAL VANDENBERG felt that he has the right to put out what C.I.G. thinks is correct. However, to fulfill its obligation as an interdepartmental agency, C.I.G. must have the views of the four departmental agencies. He felt it was best that C.I.G. have not only the agencies' views, but the reasons for these views. He agreed with Admiral Inglis that the I.A.B. has a responsibility to see, not whether C.I.G. is doing the wrong thing but that it is doing the right thing. In other words, General Vandenberg felt that the solution lay somewhere between the views of Admiral Inglis and of General Chamberlin.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that his viewpoint was that a person of General Vandenberg's caliber should be entrusted to find his own method for determining departmental views. If General Vandenberg sees a difference of opinion, it would be assumed that he would check it with the departments concerned. This should be easy, since C.I.G. will always have close liaison with the departments.

ADMIRAL INGLIS felt that it was a fundamental question whether the I.A.B. has a responsibility for C.I.G. operations. He thought that if General Chamberlin's philosophy were followed to its ultimate conclusion, it would mean that ten years from now O.N.I. would still have to have its same basic organization, since it would not be able to entrust C.I.G. to perform functions for it. If, however, O.N.I. has responsible Naval people within C.I.G., O.N.I. would then feel that the Navy's views were being represented. He felt that C.I.G. could not go off by itself. If the departmental agencies are represented, C.I.G. could then perform many duties which are now being performed by each departmental agency.

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MR. EDDY felt that the new budget plans for C.I.G. indicated a shift, since C.I.G. may now employ its own people. He did not feel, however, that this eliminated the possibility of having C.I.G. serve the departments. If each department concentrates on its primary interests, then C.I.G. can perform functions of secondary interest and special jobs which no departmental agency can perform. Then, so long as the I.A.B. is a two-way street, C.I.G. and the departmental agencies can make available the best service each to the other.

ADMIRAL INGLIS felt that this would not work unless the departments were represented in C.I.G.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that if he were called upon to submit a Naval estimate he would go to the Navy. He felt General Vandenberg would do the same. He thought, however, that if General Vandenberg felt the data on hand in C.I.G. corresponded to the opinions of the departments, General Vandenberg should be authorized to send that data forward as an intelligence estimate.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that he was afraid that if people in C.I.G. fail to represent the departmental viewpoint, C.I.G. would get off the track. He thought that C.I.G. personnel should be in close contact with the departments in order to obtain departmental views. He said that he was encouraging all C.I.G. personnel to get the views of all three departments.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he was confident C.I.G. would do that, especially since Army officers in C.I.G. are always subject to detail and rotation. He thought that the War Department's viewpoint would be represented because of the years of Army training each Army officer in C.I.G. would have. He thought that C.I.G. personnel should express their own views and not pattern them after the opinion of someone in an outside agency.

ADMIRAL INGLIS thought that the idea was to assign people to C.I.G. in order to form a link with the departments, to utilize the sources therein, and have the benefit of the combined thinking of all departments.

GENERAL VANDENBERG thought that Admiral Inglis' objective could be gained by having representatives detailed to O.R.E.

MR. LAY pointed out that the procedure to be followed by each representative in clearing papers was a matter for decision by each I.A.B. member. Admiral Inglis could instruct his representative not to vote until Admiral Inglis had approved each estimate.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that he was willing to appoint a representative part-time, but that this representative would act only as a messenger.

MR. EDDY said that he would like to see this system tried. He thought that each I.A.B. member might designate a deputy who was well trained and could bring papers to the respective I.A.B. members for clearance when necessary.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he would give his representative the responsibility for deciding whether to act on an estimate or to clear it with General Chamberlin. General Chamberlin felt, however, that this arrangement should not prevent C.I.G. research personnel from working closely with G-2 research sections.

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GENERAL CHAMBERLIN then expressed the belief that C.I.G. estimates sent to the President should not show a dissenting opinion.

ADMIRAL INGLIS thought that the President should know of any dissenting opinions, although he hoped that any differences could be reconciled before the estimates were issued. He felt, however, that estimates should not be held up unduly in an effort to reconcile divergent views.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that if each paper were handled in detail it would defeat the purpose of C.I.G., since every word or shade of meaning would be questioned.

ADMIRAL INGLIS noted that this was the procedure used in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although it had not worked perfectly, he felt that for every example where this procedure had failed to work there were ten examples where it had worked.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN noted, however, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff has no head or commander, as is the case in C.I.G.

MR. LAY pointed out that the wording of N.I.A. Directive No. 1 requires only that "substantial dissent" should be noted in C.I.G. estimates, which was intended to preclude discussion of every word or shade of meaning.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that the concept of N.I.A. was that all departments would be represented in all matters. The Director of Central Intelligence is the executive responsible for carrying out the policies of the N.I.A. The I.A.B. is more than merely an adviser. All through the N.I.A. and C.I.G. structure it was intended that there be equal representation of all departments.

GENERAL VANDENBERG pointed out that it is a matter of record in N.I.A. minutes that the N.I.A. is the agency responsible to the President, and not the Director of Central Intelligence.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN noted that the Director of Central Intelligence is not responsible to the I.A.B., but rather to the N.I.A.

GENERAL VANDENBERG pointed out, however, that the N.I.A. has delegated to the I.A.B. the right to concur for the N.I.A. members. Therefore, in the final analysis the I.A.B., by this delegation, has a measure of responsibility for the success of C.I.G. activities.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN questioned how this would work, since many other agencies of the Government were involved.

ADMIRAL INGLIS noted that this was covered by the fact that other agencies sat as members of the I.A.B. on matters of interest to those agencies.

After further discussion of detailed amendments to the Enclosure to C.I.G. 16/1,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Concurred in the issuance of the Enclosure to C.I.G. 16/1 subject to amendment to read as follows:

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- "1. To implement the provisions of Paragraph 6 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1, each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board will designate a personal representative to remain assigned to his office and detailed as liaison to the Projects Division of the Intelligence Staff of the Office of Reports and Estimates of the Central Intelligence Group.
- "2. These representatives will, as their chiefs direct, either concur in C.I.G. intelligence estimates or present dissenting opinions.
- "3. Each intelligence estimate issued by C.I.G. will either have the concurrence of all I.A.B. members or will have any substantial dissent appended as a part of the estimate or follow as provided in 4 below.
- "4. This procedure will not be permitted to prevent the presentation of any estimate on the required date. If concurrence or dissenting opinions cannot be obtained in time to meet deadlines for completion and submission of estimates, such estimates will be submitted together with a statement that only limited coordination has been attained and substantial dissent, if any, will be submitted at a later date.
- "5. C.I.G. will afford designated representatives complete opportunity to participate in all phases of the development of estimates."

(Subsequently issued as C.I.G. Administrative Order No. 32).

3. PLAN FOR COORDINATION OF BIOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE (C.I.G. 17).

GENERAL VANDENBERG gave a brief description of the plan recommended in C.I.G. 17.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN raised the question as to whether paragraph 2-c of the proposed C.I.G. Directive would authorize biographic intelligence data of one department to be made available to another department.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that if the biographic intelligence data of one department was not available to other departments, such a system would cause a great deal of duplication.

MR. EDDY stated that he believed the word "responsibility" should be left out of the first sentence of paragraph 2-c.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that he was agreeable to this omission.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that he objected to the last sentence in paragraph 2 of the covering memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence, since O.N.I. does have a good index system and it is maintained up to date.

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MR. EDGAR stated that at the time the covering memorandum was written he did not know that the Navy's index system had been completed.

ADMIRAL INGLIS questioned whether this proposed Directive would govern domestic coverage and, if so, the Federal Bureau of Investigation should have a chance to express its views on the matter under consideration.

GENERAL VANDENBERG replied that the paper did not govern domestic coverage, and was for foreign biographic intelligence only.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that the majority of inquiries made to O.N.I. were in the domestic field and he felt that this paper was too elaborate a plan for the coordination of foreign biographic intelligence.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that if the plan in this paper did not work, it could be recalled.

MR. EDGAR stated that it was desirable to get approval on this paper in order to gain proper coordination in the field.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that he should have central machine records in order to point out biographic intelligence information contained in other agencies.

ADMIRAL INGLIS agreed.

MR. EDDY stated that the provisions of paragraph 3-b of the covering memorandum would cause too much work for the State Department to undertake at this time, since the State Department had a mass of biographic information that dated back to 1790, and that to reproduce this information would be a staggering job.

MR. EDGAR explained that it was not the intent of this paper to reproduce all biographic information presently on file in the departments, but rather C.I.G. would start anew from a given date, and the information contained in the central file would be only enough to indicate the type of personality whose name appeared on each card. This would make it possible to decide whether it was desirable to obtain further details from the department having the basic file on a given individual.

MR. HECK stated that the State Department drew from a wider scope than would be reported on standard forms, and that only one or two per cent of the names in State Department file would be covered by standard report forms. He suggested that each agency concentrate on an assigned area of responsibility.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he was heartily in favor of a central file which could be consulted rather than having to contact all of the agencies in each case on which information might be desired.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that to have to go to the files of each agency on each case would take a lot of unnecessary time.

MR. HECK reiterated that such a central file would show only a small per cent of the names presently on file in the State Department

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GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that the central file proposed would be starting anew, and, while he realized it would be slow in building up, eventually it would be of benefit to all concerned.

MR. HECK stated that he believed that if the information contained on these cards got much beyond a name stage, it would involve too much duplication.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that there would naturally have to be some duplication. However, at the present time, with the volume of files in the agencies and no central index system, no one knows exactly what we do have.

MR. HECK felt that this proposal would put a heavy burden on the departmental agencies, since it would require additional people to extract the information and put it on standard cards.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN suggested that each time an agency made a summary for its own index, it send a copy to C.I.G.

ADMIRAL INGLIS suggested that to eliminate workload, cards for C.I.G. be prepared on each new report from the field or whenever departmental agencies took action to prepare a summary--as, for example, in answer to a request. He thought that on this basis the C.I.G. file would be very useful five years from now.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that was all C.I.G. asked the agencies to do.

MR. EDGAR said that C.I.G. would be willing to receive the standard form on new field reports, and copies of completed summary reports which are prepared by the agencies in answer to a request. He said that in the latter case C.I.G. would be willing to make up the central file card.

MR. HECK pointed out that this would mean that C.I.G. had a very incomplete file, representing only about five per cent of the State Department's files.

MR. EDGAR expressed the belief that, if C.I.G. received all completed summary reports, it would have information at least on personalities in which there is an active interest.

ADMIRAL INGLIS agreed that would be true in many cases, but pointed out that it would be a long time before any reliance could be felt that C.I.G.'s list was complete.

MR. EDDY stated that he believed this file should be called the central index.

MR. EDGAR stated that he believed the name of the file should indicate that it contained more than just names.

MR. EDDY suggested that the file be called a "reference index file".

ADMIRAL INGLIS recommended that the phrase "nor does any department keep a master index of their own biographic files", in paragraph 2 of the covering memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence, be omitted.

The Enclosure to C.I.G. 17 was then discussed and amendments thereto agreed upon by the Board.

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THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

- a. Agreed that the phrase "nor does any department keep a master index of their own biographic files", at the end of paragraph 2 of the covering memorandum of C.I.G. 17, should be deleted.
- b. Concurred in the recommendation in paragraph 3-b of the covering memorandum of C.I.G. 17, subject to insertion of the word "index" between "reference" and "file" on the second line thereof.
- c. Concurred in the Enclosure to C.I.G. 17, subject to the following amendments:
 - (1) Delete the word "responsible" from the second line of paragraph 2-c.
 - (2) Reword the first sentence of paragraph 3-a to read as follows: "The chief of mission of each embassy, legation or foreign post has the over-all responsibility, in accordance with the principles of this Directive, for coordinating the collection of biographic intelligence in his geographical area."
 - (3) Delete paragraph 3-b-(7)
 - (4) Delete paragraph 5-b.

(Subsequently issued as C.I.G. Directive No. 16).

4. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS--CHINA
(C.I.G. 19)

MR. EDDY suggested that this item be postponed until the next I.A.B. meeting.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN agreed, since he had not had sufficient time to study this paper. He expressed the belief, however, that the titles of Parts I and II of the proposed N.I.A. directive were reversed.

MR. EDGAR asked if, since the proposed directive had the concurrence of representatives of the I.A.B., the Board would authorize use of the directive, pending final approval, as a basis for the preparation by an interdepartmental group of a collection directive.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he would like to know what collection responsibilities are involved before deciding what information should be collected.

MR. EDGAR explained that it was felt that the collection people must know what information the researchers want before they can decide on the assignment of collection responsibilities.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that although he felt the wording could be improved, he was prepared to approve the directive as it stands.

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After further discussion,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

- a. Agreed to defer consideration of C.I.G. 19 until a meeting next Thursday, 7 November 1946.
- b. Pending final approval, authorized the use of the Enclosure to C.I.G. 19 as a basis for the preparation by an interdepartmental group of a collection directive.

5. STATUS OF N.I.A. 6

ADMIRAL INGLIS asked what was being done on N.I.A. 6, in view of the appointment of the Atomic Energy Commission.

MR. LAY explained that N.I.A. 6 was presently awaiting approval by the President, and that General Vandenberg was taking steps to get a decision on this matter.

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I. A. B. 10th MeetingCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPINTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARDAGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in Room 2169
New War Department Building
on Thursday, 7 November 1946, at 2:30 P.M.

1. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS -- CHINA
(C.I.G. 19)

For consideration of the recommendation contained
in C.I.G. 19, as agreed at the last I.A.B. meeting.

2. ESTABLISHMENT OF A CHANNEL BETWEEN THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE GROUP AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
(C.I.G. 15)

For further consideration of the problems presented
in C.I.G. 15.

3. ASSIGNMENT OF FUNCTIONS IN THE FIELD OF STATIC
INTELLIGENCE TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
(C.I.G. 13 and C.I.G. 13/1)

For consideration of the committee report contained
in C.I.G. 13/1.

JAMES S. LAY JR.

Secretary, N.I.A.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 2169
New War Department Building
on Thursday, 7 November 1946, at 2:30 P.M.

✓ Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of
Central Intelligence, in the Chair

MEMBERS PRESENT

- ✓ Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State for Research and In-
telligence
- ✓ Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director
of Intelligence, W.D.C.S.
- ✓ Rear Admiral Thomas E. Inglis, Chief of Naval
Intelligence
- ✓ Brig. General John A. Samford, Deputy Assist-
ant Chief of Air Staff-2

ALSO PRESENT

- ✓ Mr. A. Sidney Buford, Department of State
- ✓ Colonel E. J. Treacy, U.S.A.
- ✓ Captain R. K. Davis, U.S.N.
- ✓ Colonel E. P. Mussett, U.S.A.
- ✓ Mr. Donald Edgar, Central Intelligence Group

SECRETARIAT

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, N.I.A.

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1. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS--CHINA
(C.I.G. 19)

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he had difficulty understanding the purpose of this paper. If it was intended to cover over-all long-range intelligence requirements, he felt that it was incomplete. If, however, it covered only some intermediate objective, he did not have much to say except to suggest a few minor changes.

MR. EDGAR explained that this paper did not cover departmental requirements, which it was assumed would be drawn up by the various agencies. He pointed out, however, that uncoordinated and uncorrelated sets of instructions were going out to the field which did not completely fill national requirements. Therefore, the only requirements put in this paper were those which are most important from a national viewpoint. This paper covered only China as a trial area. It did not attempt, however, to define the ultimate requirements for national policy intelligence.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN noted that only three subjects were covered, whereas there are many others of interest to the War Department.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that the War Department was expected to send those out, except in those cases where C.I.G. might specifically ask for additional information.

MR. EDGAR explained that at the first interdepartmental meeting on coordination of the intelligence effort, it was agreed that the first step should be to develop a coordinated collection of intelligence requirements area by area throughout the world. Each agency representative was asked to turn in the requirements it considered most important. These were then synthesized by the Office of Reports and Estimates in C.I.G. Some of the information required was of interest to more than one department, and when the departments agreed, these requirements were put in the paper. If this paper is approved, the collection representatives from all agencies will look over Part II in order to decide which field representatives are best located to obtain the desired information and to attempt to allocate these requirements to the various field agencies.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN did not see how coordination could be accomplished in this way unless the whole problem was solved.

MR. EDDY pointed out that this was merely a test case, and that this paper might look radically different a year from now.

MR. EDGAR noted that these requirements would be reviewed quarterly.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN asked why other items of importance, such as topographic data, were not included.

MR. EDGAR explained that no attempt had been made to include static or basic intelligence. Also, no scientific intelligence requirements were included because it was felt there was nothing of interest in this area.

ADMIRAL INGLIS noted that these requirements covered only those that are currently essential.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN expressed the belief that this was intended to be an attempt to coordinate the whole collection effort in China.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that it was impossible to do this until the agencies had agreed on more basic issues, such as assignment of primary responsibilities. Meanwhile, this was an attempt to move forward as far as possible.

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ADMIRAL INGLIS said that he was willing to approve the paper as it stands, but that he was also baffled by the wording "Essential Elements of National Intelligence". He thought they were all right, however, as targets for the next three months and as a trial case.

MR. EDDY said that he was willing to approve the paper as it stands.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that the value of this paper would depend upon the effort which all agencies put behind it.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that if the three items mentioned were considered the most important, the War Department would fulfill its part of the effort as a matter of priority.

GENERAL SAMFORD understood that this was an experiment in stating current emphasis. He considered the paper all right as it is.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN expressed the belief that the terminology was twisted.

MR. EDGAR explained that the first step had been to study national policy toward China, on the theory that intelligence should operate for the policy-makers, to show them whether the policy was a success or needed change. It was felt that the essential elements were stated too broadly and were therefore broken down into collection requirements which could be turned over to the collection representatives to draft a collection directive. He realized that the terms used were somewhat different from military usage, but that the four agency representatives had agreed upon the present terminology. C.I.G., however, did not feel strongly about making a change in the terminology. Mr. Edgar suggested, and it was agreed, that "Essential Elements of National Intelligence" should be changed to read "Current Essentials of National Intelligence".

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he would prefer not to approve the paper until he had seen the collection directive based thereon. He did agree tentatively that the paper was all right as a basis for preparation of a further collection directive.

ADMIRAL INGLIS suggested that the meeting of collection representatives be held to break down the requirements into allocations to each agency. These could then be checked with the I.A.B., and when approved, each agency would issue directives to accomplish its part of the mission.

GENERAL VANDENBERG asked if a further I.A.B. meeting would be necessary if the representatives of the agencies agreed on the collection directive.

ADMIRAL INGLIS did not think it would be necessary to put the paper on the agenda for another meeting, but felt that it could be checked informally with the I.A.B. members and issued as another C.I.G. paper.

MR. EDDY suggested approval of the paper with the understanding that distribution would be withheld until assignment of collection responsibilities was agreed upon.

In answer to Mr. Eddy, MR. EDGAR said that the directives would be distributed to ambassadors and theater commanders through the appropriate departments.

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After further discussion,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

a. Agreed upon the following amendments to the Enclosure to C.I.G. 19:

(1) Change "Essential Elements of National Intelligence" to read "Current Essentials of National Intelligence" throughout the paper.

(2) In paragraph 1, line 4, change "requirements" to read "objectives".

b. Approved the Enclosure to C.I.G. 19, as amended, tentatively as a basis for the preparation of a subsequent collection directive, with the understanding that distribution would be withheld until the collection directive had been agreed upon.

2. ESTABLISHMENT OF A CHANNEL BETWEEN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (C.I.G. 15)

GENERAL VANDENBERG explained that consideration of this problem had been deferred at a previous I.A.B. meeting, and requested any further comments.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that the matter had been discussed in the J.I.C. It was a complicated problem, and it was hard to decide whether J.I.C. or I.A.B. should discuss it further. He said that the Navy Department feels that one solution is General Vandenberg's original proposal, which goes much farther than Admiral Inglis' proposal in C.I.G. 15. Admiral Inglis circulated a sketch showing how the Navy thought General Vandenberg's proposal might be put into effect. This involved moving the J.I.C. and the J.I.S. into the structure of the C.I.G. It also formed a link between the J.C.S. and the Director of Central Intelligence and between J.C.S. subcommittees and the C.I.G. It proposed a change in the membership of J.I.C. to service members only, plus the addition of the Director of Central Intelligence as a member in the same manner as on the I.A.B. With the change in membership it was suggested that the name be changed to Joint Intelligence Board (J.I.B.). Admiral Inglis thought that in peacetime the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible to the P.I.A., but that this might be reversed in wartime to make him responsible to the J.C.S. He felt that this proposal provided a necessary security wall around the military activities of J.I.C. The J.I.S. membership would stay the same except for the elimination of the State Department member. Liaison with the State Department, however, would be continued, but through the I.A.B. rather than the J.I.C.

ADMIRAL INGLIS explained that for the preparation of intelligence estimates the proposed J.I.S. would go both to O.R.E. and, for departmental intelligence, to the other departments. J.I.S. would belong to the J.I.B., with lateral communications with C.I.G.

MR. EDDY thought that might be an ultimate solution, but suggested as an interim step that the J.I.S. serve as an intelligence advisory staff to the I.A.B.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he had not figured out a solution to the problem yet, but that he did have some fundamental principles which he felt should be considered. First of all, the Joint Chiefs of Staff must remain an essentially military agency. General Chamberlin felt, however, that General Eisenhower would be hesitant to change any existing arrangements for coordination with the State Department.

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ADMIRAL INGLIS said that he would like to make it perfectly clear that the Navy Department wants a link with the State Department and considers it absolutely essential. There is no intent, in the proposal he just outlined, to stop such coordination. It was felt, however, that coordination with the State Department would be adequately assured through the I.A.B.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN noted that the mission of the Director of Central Intelligence goes far beyond the scope of the J.C.S. Therefore, nothing should be done to circumscribe C.I.G. into a lesser mission. This is a second fundamental which General Eisenhower feels should be observed. Third, it would be bad to circumscribe free and direct contact, especially in wartime, from the J.C.S. to the President. Fourth, there should be nothing in the arrangement, as far as the making of war plans is concerned, which interpolates a civilian agency between planning agencies of the J.C.S., but, as General Vandenberg noted, these J.C.S. agencies should not be denied any intelligence necessary to enable them to perform their mission. Fifth, no agencies other than strictly military should have access to military plans. This should be a matter of right on the part of military agencies, for security reasons. General Chamberlin said that he was unable to figure out an organization which observed all of those fundamental principles. He felt, however, that there was great advantage in Admiral Inglis' original suggestion in C.I.G. 15, since it would at least provide a piecemeal approach to the problem.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that the principles enunciated by General Chamberlin were also the objectives for which the C.I.G. was striving. He pointed out that the C.I.G. proposal provided a watertight compartment for the military. He observed, however, that allied to that consideration is the fact that the war planners must have the best intelligence and that it must be constantly supplied to them. The intelligence agency, therefore, should work right along with the planners. Specifically, General Vandenberg noted that Admiral Inglis' new proposal established a watertight military compartment, but placed it next to the C.I.G., where it could draw on all available intelligence.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN noted that there were some subjects covered by J.I.C. subcommittees which C.I.G. should not have.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that some could be put under the J.I.B. and others, such as the Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board and the Publications Review Subcommittee, could be integrated into C.I.G.

MR. EDDY said that he was willing to accept Admiral Inglis' new proposal as an ultimate objective. He thought, however, that it would be possible to proceed immediately to liquidate the J.I.C. subcommittees and then follow that with Admiral Inglis' proposal.

GENERAL VANDENBERG felt that it would be difficult to justify the initial step proposed in C.I.G. 15 until a broad plan had been presented for approval. He thought that the broad plan should first be approved in principle and then the initial step approved for immediate implementation. He noted that if the process stopped after the initial step had been taken, C.I.G. would be accountable but not responsible.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that one difficulty which had been discovered in his proposal in C.I.G. 15 was that personnel assigned to J.C.S. subcommittees may not be assigned additional duties without the approval of the J.C.S. He agreed with General Vandenberg that the ultimate objective should be presented at the same time that the initial step is submitted for approval.

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MR. EDDY felt that the question of the ultimate objective involved very broad considerations. He pointed out that there were three policy-forming groups -- namely, the State Department in the political field, the J.C.S. in the military field, and the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee in politico-military matters. He thought that the relationship of those groups should be carefully considered and presented in any ultimate solution. He felt that it might be premature to attempt to outline the ultimate objective.

GENERAL VANDENBERG thought that it might be possible to show the end objective in broad terms, how far it was now possible to go, and why the initial step was being taken.

MR. EDDY felt that this would require considerable time-consuming staff work to prepare. Therefore, he would like to see the first step taken as soon as possible.

GENERAL VANDENBERG suggested that if there was general agreement, Admiral Inglis' new proposal could be used as the ultimate objective and the proposal in C.I.G. 15 as the initial step. He suggested that people from ICAPS and the agencies be designated to write up such a proposal for consideration by the N.I.A. and the J.C.S.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that he could not say at this time that he approved the end result suggested by Admiral Inglis. He thought a way should be found to get the intelligence from C.I.G. without interpolating C.I.G. into the J.C.S. He explained that he was not opposed to General Vandenberg personally, but was in general doubtful of the wisdom of mixing up in the J.C.S. the head of an agency who reported to civilian authority.

ADMIRAL INGLIS asked if, in case of war, it would not be desirable to have the Director of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Group under the command of the J.C.S.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that in case of war he thought that the C.I.G. should be brought into the J.C.S. organization and made responsible for the whole intelligence effort. He granted that this would involve abolishing the J.I.C.

ADMIRAL INGLIS expressed the belief that the J.C.S. would not agree to abolish the J.I.C., any more than they would to the abolition of the Joint War Plans Committee. He noted that at present the Director of Central Intelligence reported to the N.I.A. His proposal was that the Director of Central Intelligence be assigned additional duties to serve the J.C.S. If at any time the Director of Central Intelligence was not agreeable to the J.C.S., the J.C.S. could easily cancel the agreement.

MR. EDDY said that he agreed with this proposal, but noted that it must be submitted to the N.I.A. and the J.C.S.

GENERAL VANDENBERG agreed because he felt that they would want to know what lay behind the initial step.

MR. EDDY thought that would be desirable, but felt that if they could not agree on the ultimate objective, the initial step should be recommended as improving liaison between C.I.G. and J.I.C.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that he would like to wait a week or so to see if staff members could not write something which would be agreeable to the I.A.B.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he could not see what progress would be made, because he was fundamentally opposed to the principles involved in Admiral Inglis' new proposal.

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GENERAL VANDENBERG said that he felt it was the responsibility of the I.A.B. to recommend approval of some plan. He suggested, therefore, that if there was disagreement within the I.A.B., both a majority and a minority report be submitted to the N.I.A. He noted that nothing was being done about this situation at the present time. He wanted to stop unnecessary duplication, and felt that the solution of this problem was one of the best ways to avoid it.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN believed that the Director of Central Intelligence should not be on the J.I.B.

ADMIRAL INGLIS felt that if the Director of Central Intelligence is made responsible for furnishing intelligence, he must know the purpose which the intelligence is to serve.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN felt there was some way to provide for a lateral communication with the Director of Central Intelligence in order to obtain intelligence which would then go up through the J.I.B. He thought that the initial step proposed in C.I.G. 15 was worth trying.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that this would put either the Director of Central Intelligence or the J.I.C. in an untenable position if it lasted for long. He said that he would agree to that arrangement for a short period, but that there must be a limit placed on its duration.

ADMIRAL INGLIS felt that the proposal in C.I.G. 15 was all right as a first step, but that it would not solve the problem. It would not tie C.I.G. in close enough with the J.I.C., and it would not eliminate all of the duplication.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he could understand General Vandenberg's objections. He thought, therefore, that General Vandenberg's suggestion for preparation of a staff paper was best. It would then be possible to see what points could be agreed on, and to put up a minority report on those points that are not agreed. He said that he thought it was a responsibility of the J.I.C. to get intelligence from the C.I.G. He hoped to see a solution. He thought that the J.I.S. should work with the C.I.G. to get intelligence, provided security of military information was not jeopardized.

GENERAL VANDENBERG felt that this would lead to the same difficulty that the J.I.C. is now encountering with the Joint War Plans Committee, in not knowing what is wanted. He felt strongly that if C.I.G. was asked for intelligence without being familiar with what was involved, it would put out intelligence without giving it proper weight or considering the ramifications or including all of the intelligence that might be available.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN did not think that C.I.G. should be taken into military planning.

GENERAL VANDENBERG pointed out that Admiral Inglis' new proposal would provide a watertight military compartment within C.I.G.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that there must be a watertight compartment somewhere. The question is just where it should be established.

After further discussion,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Designated the following individuals as representatives to work with the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning

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Staff of C.I.G. in drafting proposed recommendations to the N.I.A. and the J.C.S. on the relationship between C.I.G. and the J.C.S., including, if necessary, a majority and minority report:

For Mr. Eddy:	Mr. Merritt B. Booth Mr. A. Sidney Buford
For General Chamberlin:	Colonel E. J. Treacy, Jr. Colonel L. L. Williams Colonel J. K. Dickey
For Admiral Inglis:	Captain R. K. Davis Captain F. S. Habecker
For General McDonald:	Colonel E. P. Mussett Colonel L. C. Sherman
For Secretariat, J.I.C.:	Captain R. U. Hyde

3. ASSIGNMENT OF FUNCTIONS IN THE FIELD OF STATIC INTELLIGENCE TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
(C.I.G. 13 and C.I.G. 13/1)

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that ICAPS was now trying to solve the basic issues in the subject papers. Therefore, even if this specific study were cancelled as proposed in C.I.G. 13/1, this would not mean that further action on the subject would not be taken.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that he was willing to concur in C.I.G. 13/1, but that he wanted the record to show that the Navy will go just as far as other participating departments in collaborative efforts in this field.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he would like to state some principles which he felt should govern the solution of this problem. First of all, he felt that each department should be supreme in its field of primary responsibility. For example, in its field of primary responsibility he did not think that the War Department could assign its functions to another agency because the War Department is charged by law with performing them. General Chamberlin thought, therefore, that the first thing to do was to assign areas of primary responsibility to each department. Then matters which are not in the field of these primary responsibilities should be assigned to C.I.G. He thought that those assignments should carry into the field of collection, but that they should not draw a narrow corridor which would prevent any field representative from getting useful information.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that he thought everyone agreed to these principles, but he questioned whether they had been transmitted to the agency representatives who were working with ICAPS.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that the implementation of those principles should be carefully timed to cause a minimum of interruption in the performance of necessary functions. He expressed the belief that the War Department now had the best balanced intelligence agency, and was fully engaged in the preparation of Strategic Intelligence Digests (S.I.D.). He hoped to obtain permission to complete these S.I.D.'s as a basis for assignment of responsibilities. Even after responsibilities had been assigned, he felt that each department must have a unit which is capable of presenting the whole picture to the officials of that department. He therefore would like to see the War Department preserve a strong Military Intelligence Service to fulfill the requirements of the Chief of Staff. For example, the War Department was working on war potential, which covers a very wide field. On this matter, the War

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Department was getting advice from other departments, but nevertheless was ultimately responsible for that field. He hoped that this statement of fundamentals would indicate the reason why he was voting as he had.

ADMIRAL INGLIS agreed that the principles were fine, but required definition. For example, what is military intelligence? He felt that while it was granted that the War Department was responsible for military intelligence, it should also be granted that the War Department must get intelligence elsewhere in order to complete the picture. This meant looking to other departments over which the War Department had no authority.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he was perfectly willing to trust the State Department, Navy Department, and Air Forces for the intelligence in their fields of primary responsibility.

ADMIRAL INGLIS thought, then, that if it was granted that the War Department must obtain intelligence from agencies other than those under its command, it then became a question of which agency or agencies were best qualified and most efficient to produce the intelligence required. That was the principle Admiral Inglis had in mind in C.I.G. 13. He thought it would be possible to pool items of common interest in C.I.G. Then each agency would make available all that it received in those fields, and would draw off from C.I.G. what it needed. Admiral Inglis noted that General Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz had directed General Craig and Admiral Inglis to join M.I.D. and O.N.I. in all possible fields. He said that an effort had been made to accomplish this, but that nothing had happened. Now with C.I.G. formed, he thought it might be possible to turn over some of these functions of common interest to C.I.G.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN did not recall having seen the directive to which Admiral Inglis referred, but said that he was nevertheless willing to follow the principles which he had enunciated.

MR. EDDY said that he was in sympathy with the committee report, C.I.G. 13/1. He would like, however, to see the responsibility and functions of the Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board transferred to C.I.G. He said that if that recommendation were made, he would vote for it.

GENERAL VANDENBERG expressed appreciation for Mr. Eddy's suggestion, but felt that it was first necessary to settle the broader questions involved. If action was blocked after such piecemeal steps had been taken, it would not help the over-all intelligence picture.

GENERAL SAMFORD thought that the guiding principle was that the functions required by each agency staff must be performed in that staff. Everything else he was willing to centralize.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that an example was the question of war potential in Russia. He noted that the War Department was now engaged in a comprehensive study of that subject, and he wondered whether it was intended that this project should be stopped.

ADMIRAL INGLIS thought that was an excellent example, since it involved intelligence of interest to all three departments. While G-2 was responsible for furnishing that data to the Chief of Staff, Military Attaches and other War Department sources were not adequate to get what was needed. The same thing is true in the Navy and State Departments. No one agency is competent to get all that information; each must rely on the other. Each now has a collecting agency feeding in that type of material. Admiral Inglis said that his idea was that when this information was received,

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instead of each agency having about a hundred people picking the brains of other agencies, fifty from each department could be transferred into C.I.G., where, with half the people, they would receive all departmental source material and do a better job.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN agreed that this was all right in theory, but that it would cause delay. For example, the War Department has already written hundreds of pages on all countries, and he did not think that work should be interrupted.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that his example was something that could be worked up to. He did not think that any project should be interrupted until it could be taken over efficiently by C.I.G.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN agreed, and said that he thought that 30 June 1947 would be a date on which his projects could be turned over to some other agency.

ADMIRAL INGLIS recommended that the procedure be worked out step by step and extend over a period of time.

GENERAL VANDENBERG felt that each agency, when it transferred a function to C.I.G., should still have a feeling of responsibility and an interest in seeing that the people who were working on the project were also transferred, in order to ensure the best possible product.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that 30 June 1947 was an agreeable date for turning over to C.I.G.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he would be willing to furnish surplus personnel available on that date. He pointed out, however, that G-2 had already let out some 700 individuals and was about down to its minimum requirements for military intelligence. In fact, there were fields of military intelligence which G-2 is not now covering. Therefore, when the S.I.D.'s are completed, G-2 would have to turn those people to the performance of some other G-2 function.

ADMIRAL INGLIS felt that there were two additional principles that should be recognized: First, each agency, in fulfilling its responsibilities, must collaborate with other agencies to complete the picture. Second, each agency has a responsibility for the successful performance of C.I.G.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he felt a responsibility, as a member of the I.A.B., for the manner in which C.I.G. grows. On the other hand, he felt that one responsibility of C.I.G. was to build strong organizations in the departments to fulfill their primary functions.

GENERAL VANDENBERG agreed, but noted that C.I.G. has no control over that matter at the present time.

After further discussion,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Approved the recommendation in the Enclosure to C.I.G. 13/1, with the understanding that the basic issues involved are under continuing study by ICAPS and agency representatives.

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COPY NO. 34

I.A.B. 11th Meeting

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in Room 2178
New War Department Building
on Tuesday, 26 November 1946, at 10:00 A.M.

1. COORDINATION OF COLLECTION ACTIVITIES
(C.I.G. 18/2)

For consideration of the recommendations
contained in C.I.G. 18/2.

2. PRODUCTION OF POLITICAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY ON U.S.S.R.
(C.I.G. 20)

For consideration of the recommendations
contained in C.I.G. 20.

3. EXPLOITATION OF ENEMY DOCUMENT REPOSITORIES
(C.I.G. 21)

For consideration of the recommendations
contained in C.I.G. 21.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

Secretary, N.I.A.

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COPY NO. 18

I.A.B. 11th Meeting

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 2178
New War Department Building
on Tuesday, 26 November 1946, at 10:00 A.M.

Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of
Central Intelligence, in the Chair

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State for Research and In-
telligence
Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director
of Intelligence, W.D.G.S.
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval
Intelligence
(Mr. Brig. General George C. McDonald, Assistant)
Chief of Air Staff-2

ALSO PRESENT

Brig. General John A. Samford, Deputy Assistant
Chief of Air Staff-2
Mr. A. Sidney Buford, Department of State
Mr. George R. Fearing, Department of State
Colonel E. J. Treacy, U.S.A.
Captain R. K. Davis, U.S.N.
Colonel E. P. Mussett, U.S.A.
Mr. Donald Edgar, Central Intelligence Group

SECRETARIAT

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, N.I.A.
Mr. J. S. Earmen, Assistant Secretary, N.I.A.

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1. COORDINATION OF COLLECTION ACTIVITIES
(C.I.G. 18/2)

GENERAL VANDENBERG gave a brief description of the contents of C.I.G. 18/2. He also stated that at this time he would like to make it a matter of record in the minutes that certain collection activities assigned to the Central Intelligence Group, namely, those covered by Special Operations, F.B.I.S. and information gained from business concerns and individuals who have traveled abroad, would not be governed by this paper.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that this was the finest piece of work turned out so far and that as suggested by General Vandenberg we should get away from detail. General Chamberlin felt, however, that the paper should assign fields of primary responsibility for all activities, rather than being confined only to coordination of collection. He believed that the general assignment of responsibilities contained in paragraph 2 a of the proposed C.I.G. Directive should be taken out and made into a N.I.A. Directive.

MR. LAY explained that the preparation of a S.I.D. on the U.S.S.R. is in fact now an inter-agency operation under C.I.G. coordination.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN suggested that the word "area" in paragraph 1 b of the proposed N.I.A. Directive be changed to "country."

MR. EDGAR explained that the word "area" was used since it was not at all impossible that certain countries by name would not be covered, hence the responsibility for coverage would necessarily have to be given to the coordinator covering that area in which such countries might be located.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that we must realize that Ambassadors are political officers sent out without intelligence training. He therefore felt that we should define certain broad principles by which the Ambassadors should be guided.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that this was a fine paper. He said, however, that he had not had time enough to study the paper as thoroughly as he wished, but would agree to it in its broad principles.

GENERAL VANDENBERG then asked Admiral Inglis if it could be approved for use as a guide.

ADMIRAL INGLIS answered that he would like to request another week to study this paper and suggested that an ad hoc committee be appointed to consider the paper further, in view of the fact that he had some changes to recommend.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that he felt that there should be no further delay and that those parts of the paper that were highly controversial could be taken out and resubmitted at a later date for further consideration.

MR. EDDY agreed with General Vandenberg's suggestion and stated that he was in agreement that an ad hoc committee be appointed. He further stated that ICAPS had prepared a very fine paper. Mr. Eddy said that the collection of intelligence in the field presented a separate problem from that of the over-all policies governing coordination of intelligence activities. Mr. Eddy went on to say that the intelligence scene in Washington differed from that in the field in view of possible reduction in one Department and increases in others.

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GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that he believed the assignment of basic responsibilities should be the same for Washington as the field.

MR. EDDY stated that he did not quite agree with this and that he felt that there should be an over-all policies and objectives directive and a separate collection directive for the field.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that he believed that there should first be a N.I.A. Directive on collection policies.

MR. EDDY suggested that General Chamberlin's over-all written suggestions, which were previously passed to the I.A.B. members, be turned over to ICAPS for consideration and that we go ahead on the collection directive.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that he felt that the broad principles of the paper should cover all contingencies.

MR. EDDY stated that he felt that the collection directive should be separate.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that he felt that the first place to tackle this problem was on the evaluation level here in Washington rather than in the field.

MR. EDDY stated that he believed that collection in the field could be covered separately, particularly since there may be changes in Washington which in a great many instances would not affect the collection activities in the field.

ADMIRAL INGLIS suggested that the collection problem be considered now and the over-all problem be considered at a later date.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that he was ready to vote on both problems, taking into consideration his suggestions.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that he could not go along with General Chamberlin's suggestion since he felt that Navy had not had time enough to study the problem. He suggested that an ad hoc committee be appointed to work on C.I.G. 18/2 and that ICAPS undertake another study on the ultimate responsibilities of the production of intelligence.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN agreed to go along on getting out the collection directive if agreement could not be reached on the whole problem.

MR. EDGAR stated that he hoped that S.I.D. would not be turned over all at once, in order to give C.I.G. a chance to build up a staff, since he did not feel it would be right to begin recruiting a staff at the present time, and have them sit around until June with nothing to do.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that as they completed a chapter it would be turned over to C.I.G.

After further discussion,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

a. Agreed to have ICAPS reconsider C.I.G. 18/2 in the light of General Chamberlin's written suggestions and the general discussion in the meeting.

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b. Agreed that ICAPS prepare a companion document covering the coordination of the production and dissemination of intelligence.

c. Agreed that an I.A.B. ad hoc committee composed of Colonel Fearing, Colonel Fennis, General Samford and Captain Davis will review the revision of C.I.G. 18/2 and subsequently the directive which will be prepared by ICAPS for the coordination of the production and dissemination of intelligence.

d. Agreed that the revision of C.I.G. 18/2 be submitted to the I.A.B. and that the directive for the coordination of the production and dissemination of intelligence be submitted when prepared to the I.A.B.

2. PRODUCTION OF POLITICAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY ON U.S.S.R. (C.I.G. 20)

GENERAL VANDENBERG briefly explained the recommendations contained in this paper. He stated that there appeared to be two courses of action open:

a. A specialist or specialists in this particular field could be contracted to prepare such a study which would be disseminated as intelligence information, the contents of which would be the views of the individuals preparing the study, only.

b. A specialist or specialists in this particular field could be contracted to prepare such a study under C.I.G. (ORE) guidance. An ORE evaluation would be placed on the study prior to dissemination.

He further stated that C.I.G. preferred course a.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that he did not quite understand what was meant.

GENERAL VANDENBERG explained that the study would be prepared and presented to the interested agencies over the signature of the person preparing the study and that there would be no evaluation whatsoever by C.I.G. The study in short would be presented for "what it was worth." He also stated that this study then could be used as a basis on which the agencies could expand their own thoughts on what was presented.

MR. RADDY thought it might be better to have a group work on this study.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that at the present time he felt that there were only a limited number of people who could prepare such a study, and furthermore that such a study, if prepared by Dr. Ladislav Farago, would be what he thought and not a result of his being given access to the files of the agencies. He particularly pointed out that Dr. Farago was a Hungarian by birth and great care should be exercised relative to the classified material given to him in the event he was selected to make the study.

GENERAL VANDENBERG felt that for the timely completion of the study it would be better to have one person prepare it.

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MR. EDDY suggested that possibly one man could be found to go along with whoever might be selected to make the study.

GENERAL VANDENBERG agreed and asked Mr. Eddy if he could find some one.

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

a. Approved the recommendations in C.I.G. 20 pending the securing of a person and possibly an assistant to conduct this study.

3. EXPLOITATION OF ENEMY DOCUMENT REPOSITORIES
(C.I.G. 21)

GENERAL VANDENBERG briefly outlined the recommendations contained in C.I.G. 21 and stated that in view of the fact that the priority on such a plan is questionable and that C.I.G. is not prepared to undertake this program it be held in abeyance until the document situation is sufficiently clarified for constructive C.I.G. recommendations.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that this was just the reason why he had made the recommendations contained in this paper at the present time since he was afraid that the documents might soon be lost.

GENERAL VANDENBERG replied that C.I.G. is at the present time awaiting a reply from the Navy relative to the transfer of the Washington Document Center to C.I.G.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that he thought that this reply had been made and that he would take action to see why C.I.G. had not received an answer from the Navy.

GENERAL McDONALD stated that there were a lot of documents still in Berlin and that he believed that microfilms of the documents were presently in this country.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that he felt that quite a few of these documents in Berlin were still there in view of the War Crimes Trials.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that there are literally, not car-loads nor tons, but ship loads of captured enemy documents.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that he was well aware of this fact and that in view of his personnel situation he could only contribute a limited amount of help.

GENERAL VANDENBERG suggested that a committee be appointed to look into all the problems involving the present document situation.

GENERAL McDONALD stated that a representative of the Library of Congress had looked through some of the captured documents in the possession of the Air Force.

GENERAL VANDENBERG suggested that it might be well to appoint an inter-agency group to look over the problems arising from this paper.

GENERAL McDONALD felt that it was dangerous to delay too long in considering the document question.

GENERAL VANDENBERG asked Admiral Inglis whether he felt we should wait or appoint a committee to consider the problems which had arisen from this discussion.

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ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that he felt that we should appoint a committee and go ahead.

GENERAL VANDENBERG questioned whether it would be well to have a representative of the Library of Congress as a member of this committee.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated we should be very careful about the person selected from the Library of Congress and that we should make certain that the selectee was secure.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that C.I.G. would select an individual from the Library of Congress who would be agreeable to all agencies and that we should make certain that he had been cleared before being put to work.

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

a. Agreed to appoint a committee consisting of Mr. Kilgour, State Department, Colonel St. Clair, G-2, Colonel Robert Taylor, A-2, Captain Murphy, Navy, and a representative from the Library of Congress to consider the document situation.

b. Agreed to let C.I.G. 21 go over until a report had been received from the above-appointed committee.

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SECRETI.A.B. 15th MeetingCOPY NO. 35INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARDAGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in Room 7117
North Interior Building
on Thursday, 31 July 1947 at 2:00 P. M.

1. CIG REPRESENTATION ON U. S. GOVERNMENT
MISSIONS ABROAD
(IAB 4)

For consideration of the recommendations
contained in IAB 4.

2. COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION
(IAB 1 and IAB 1/1)

For consideration of the recommendations
contained in IAB 1 and IAB 1/1.

J. S. FARMAN

Secretary, N.I.A.

(1941)

SECRETIAB 15th Meeting

SECRET15th IAB MeetingCOPY NO. 35INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 7117
North Interior Building
on Thursday, 31 July 1947 at 2:00 P.M.

Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, Director
 of Central Intelligence, in the Chair

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to
 the Secretary of State for Research
 and Intelligence
 Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, *Brig Gen William E. Todd*
 Director of Intelligence, WDGS
 Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of
 Naval Intelligence
 Maj. General George C. McDonald, Assistant
 Chief of Air Staff-2
R. A. John E. Schulgen DIR of Intel & Sec. AFE

ALSO PRESENT

~~Brig. General Geo. F. Schulgen, AAF-2~~
 Mr. Donald Edgar, Central Intelligence
 Group *Cat Bouch*
 Mr. Park Armstrong, Department of State
 Capt. R. K. Davis, USN
 Lt. Colonel Edgar J. Treacy, WDGS
 Major W. C. Baird, AAF-2

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Mr. J. S. Earman, Secretary, N.I.A.

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1. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE requested the concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board that a letter be written to the National Security Council, when formed, recommending that all directives, under which the IAB and the CIG now function, remain in full force and effect until such time as that Council may desire to make such changes as it sees fit in these directives.

After some discussion, THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD Concurred in the request of the Director as outlined above.

2. CIG REPRESENTATION ON U. S. GOVERNMENT MISSIONS ABROAD
(IAB 4)

Upon being asked for comments, MR. EDDY stated that the State Department did not favorably consider the recommendations contained in the subject paper. He said that this paper introduced CIG into the collection of overt and positive intelligence abroad which had already been divided by fields of dominant interest within the membership of the IAB.

After some discussion, wherein the Director and the members of the IAB stated they concurred in Mr. Eddy's statement,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
Agreed to withdraw the recommendations
contained in IAB 4.

3. COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION
(IAB 1 and IAB 1/1)

THE DIRECTOR stated that he felt that the IAB would be getting into difficulties if they changed the definitions of basic, current, and staff intelligence as approved by the IAB at its 13th meeting since he felt that the recommendations of the Lexicographer of the Library of Congress were a play on words.

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MR. EDDY stated that he thought the changes recommended by the Lexicographer lacked conviction.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that he believed that the changes recommended were good and, while it was not a matter of great moment, it was his belief that they gave a clearer meaning to the definitions.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that he felt very strongly that the action of the IAB in regard to this matter should be interpreted by the spirit of the definitions in question and not by a play on an individual word. He went on to say that if the changes recommended by the Lexicographer were accepted, immediately the idea of "time evaluation" was given up.

ADMIRAL INGLIS asked General Chamberlin if he was referring to basic intelligence.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN replied that his remarks referred to both basic and current intelligence. He pointed out that distinction had been made on time and evaluation in the definitions of basic and current intelligence, as previously approved by the IAB.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN went on to say, however, that he felt that the changes recommended by the Lexicographer in the definition of staff intelligence made that definition read much better without changing its original meaning.

MR. EDDY said he felt that the recommended changes in basic and current intelligence changed the meaning of these two definitions. He noted, however, that the change recommended in the definition of staff intelligence was an improvement.

GENERAL McDONALD stated that he agreed with Mr. Eddy.

THE DIRECTOR stated that he agreed with General Chamberlin that the IAB's action in this matter should be governed by the interpretation of the spirit of the definitions in question and not by a play on an individual word.

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ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that he thought it quite important that the IAB have an unmistakable understanding of the meaning of basic, current, and staff intelligence, and he was not inclined to belittle the importance of definitions. He went on to say, however, that in this particular case he did not think the recommended change in the definitions of basic and current intelligence were of any great substance or consequence and he was willing to accept these two definitions as previously approved, and the definition of staff intelligence as rewritten by the Lexicographer. He noted, however, that he preferred all of the changes recommended by the Lexicographer in the definitions of basic, current, and staff intelligence.

After some discussion, THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

a. Agreed to leave unchanged the definitions of basic and current intelligence, as previously approved by the IAB at its 13th meeting.

b. Agreed to change the definition of staff intelligence to read as follows:
"Staff intelligence is that intelligence prepared by any department or agency through the correlation and interpretation of all intelligence materials available to it in order to meet its specific requirements and responsibilities."

4. EXPLOITATION OF ENEMY DOCUMENT REPOSITORIES
(CIG 21 and CIG 21/1)

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated he would like to inquire as to the present status of the subject paper since he had recently received several requests from the Navy Department as to what action was to be taken on this matter. He said that the Director of Central Intelligence, at a previous IAB

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meeting, had stated that at that time CIG was unable to consider the recommendations contained in CIG 21/1 due to budgetary problems. He went on to say that it was his understanding that since that meeting CIG's budgetary problems had been settled.

THE DIRECTOR noted the remarks of Admiral Inglis and stated he desired to make a further check of the funds available to CIG which might be allocated to carry out the recommendations contained in CIG 21/1.

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SECRETI.A.B. 16th MeetingCOPY NO. 35INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARDAGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in Room 7117
North Interior Building
on Thursday, 11 September 1947 at 2:00 P.M.

1. ACTION BY THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
ON MATTERS SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY
(CIG 24/2)

For consideration of the recommendations
contained in CIG 24/2 and its enclosure
thereto.

2. COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION
(IAB 1, IAB 1/1 and IAB 1/2)

For consideration of the recommendations
contained in the enclosure to IAB 1/2.

3. REORGANIZATION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
GROUP

For discussion of the plan outlined in a
memorandum to the individual members of
the Intelligence Advisory Board, dated
15 August 1947 - Subject: "Reorganiza-
tion of Central Intelligence Group".

J. S. EARMAN
Secretary, N.I.A.

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16th IAB Meeting

COPY NO. 17

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 7117,
North Interior Building
on Thursday, 11 September 1947 at 2:00 P. M.

Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, Director
of Central Intelligence, in the Chair

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State for Research and Intelli-
gence
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval
Intelligence
Major General George C. McDonald, Assistant
Chief of Air Staff-2
Rear Admiral John E. Gingrich, Director of
Intelligence and Security, Atomic Energy
Commission
Brig. General Walter E. Todd, Deputy Director
of Intelligence, WDGS

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. Donald Edgar, Central Intelligence Group
Colonel Merritt B. Booth, Department of State
Captain R. K. Davis, USN
Colonel E. P. Mussett, AAF-2
Colonel G. C. Nye, AAF-2
Lt. Colonel Edgar J. Treacy, WDGS
Capt. Patrick Henry, USN

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Mr. J. S. Earman, Secretary, N.I.A.

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1. ACTION BY THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD ON
MATTERS SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL INTELLI-
GENCE AUTHORITY
 (CIG 24/2)

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER stated that the ad hoc committee appointed to prepare recommendations on the subject paper to the Intelligence Advisory Board was in agreement with the recommendations contained in the enclosure to CIG 24/2, with the exception that the member from the Intelligence Division, WDGS, and the member from the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2 did not concur in the inclusion of paragraph 4 in the enclosure to CIG 24/2.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that he wished to recommend that the fourth sentence of paragraph 1 be amended to read as follows:

"If the IAB proposes to refer any such recommendation to a special study group or otherwise to delay the presentation of the recommendation to the NIA (NSC), but the Director of Central Intelligence considers such delay inadvisable, the IAB members shall have seven working days, after receipt of the views of the Director of Central Intelligence regarding such delay, for the submission of any desired statement of non-concurrence, the basis of which will accompany the recommendation to the NIA (NSC)."

MR. EDDY stated he wished to recommend the insertion of the following sentence between the second and third sentences of paragraph 1:

"Substance of the statement of the non-concurrence shall accompany the statement to the NIA (NSC)."

GENERAL McDONALD noted that it seemed advisable to him to delete paragraph 4, since the contents of that paragraph presented a special problem in itself.

After some discussion the INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD approved the enclosure to CIG 24/2 with the following exceptions:

- a. That paragraph 4 thereof be deleted.
- b. That the changes recommended by Mr. Eddy and Admiral Inglis, as indicated above, be adopted.

2. COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION
 (IAB 1, IAB 1/1 and IAB 1/2)

THE DIRECTOR requested comments on the recommendations contained in IAB 1/2.

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ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that the Chief of Naval Operations felt that in view of the National Security Act of 1947, which established naval aviation as an integral part of the Navy, the position of the Navy should be made clear in all papers which dealt with the jurisdiction, cognizance, or responsibility on the subject of naval aviation. The Navy had, in cooperation with the Intelligence Division, Army Air Forces, an agency called the Air Intelligence Division which has been serving both the Army and Navy and Army Air Forces under instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Navy wanted nothing to occur which would interfere in any way with the present effective operation of the Air Intelligence Division, and further that unless paragraph 4 of the proposed NIA Directive on the coordination of intelligence production was changed as recommended in IAB 1/2, some day after the present incumbents were gone, controversy might arise as to the interests of the Navy in air intelligence and, therefore, a change in the wording of this paragraph as recommended by the Navy was not only advisable and desirable, but necessary to recognize the interest of the Navy in air intelligence.

GENERAL McDONALD stated that on the subject of the Strategic Vulnerability Branch which is in existence - this Branch was authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to function within the framework of A-2. However, the National Security Act of 1947 does define to some general extent areas of responsibility for the ground, sea and air forces. He had coordinated with the Air Staff the proposed change recommended by the Navy on the subject paper, and as a result the Air Forces recommended that paragraph 4 remain as written.

GENERAL TODD stated that GENERAL CHAMBERLIN thought that the subject paper was not the paper in which to try to define fields of dominant interest, since, if it was attempted to define one field, an attempt should be made to define, for example, military intelligence. GENERAL CHAMBERLIN felt that there should follow in a subsequent paper, defined in greater detail, fields of dominant interest. However, he felt that the fields of dominant

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interests as outlined in the subject paper were generally satisfactory. GENERAL CHAMBERLIN felt that he did not believe dominant interest could be shared, since each of the member IAB agencies certainly had a great deal of interest in the other fields.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that he agreed with GENERAL CHAMBERLIN's thoughts and was willing to make some alteration in the wording of his recommended change to the proposed directive in question. For example, the Navy and Army Air Forces to share air intelligence each to their respective needs.

COLONEL MUSSETT stated that he thought this was taken into account in the definition of staff intelligence. He said that A-2 recognized that each Department must produce all intelligence that was necessary to its own needs.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that he did not quite agree with the A-2 viewpoint, since the Navy's need for air intelligence went beyond the question of staff intelligence. He said that naval air intelligence goes into the field of impact of foreign aviation on naval operations, not necessarily air operations, but the naval surface, submarines, amphibious, transports, logistics, and supply, and for that reason the Navy felt that it did have an interest in air intelligence which they believed had to be recognized.

After further discussion, the INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD agreed to forward the proposed directive on the coordination of intelligence production to the NIA, together with the non-concurrence of the Navy member and the comments of the Air member. (Note: The non-concurrence of the Navy member and the comments of the Air member are to be submitted to the Secretary, NIA, within seven working days after date of this meeting.)

3. REORGANIZATION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE stated he was withdrawing the memorandum to the individual members of the INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD, dated 15 August 1947, subject - "Reorganization of the Central Intelligence Group", and would submit new recommendations on this subject.

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4. TRANSFER OF THE JANIS PROGRAM TO CIG

ADMIRAL INGLIS asked the status of the proposed transfer of the JANIS program to the Central Intelligence Group.

THE DIRECTOR replied that CIG had received a request from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assume responsibility for this program and that necessary action was being taken to effect the transfer of functions and personnel of this activity to the Central Intelligence Group.

5. OVERALL POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES FOR THE COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS
(CIG 22)

ADMIRAL INGLIS asked the status of CIG 22.

MR. EDGAR replied that further consideration of this paper was being held pending approval of the proposed directive on the coordination of intelligence production.

6. EXPLOITATION OF ENEMY DOCUMENT REPOSITORIES
(CIG 21 and CIG 21/1)

ADMIRAL INGLIS asked what had been decided by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE on the recommendations contained in the enclosure to CIG 21/1.

THE DIRECTOR replied that there was some question as to his authority to expend the sum of approximately \$82,950 to carry out the recommendations contained in the enclosure to CIG 21/1.

After some discussion, THE DIRECTOR agreed to request formal approval from the NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY that authority be granted to the Director of Central Intelligence to expend approximately \$82,950 of funds allotted to CIG to carry out the recommendations contained in enclosure to CIG 21/1.

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COPY NO. 36

I.A.B. 12th Meeting

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in Room 2178
New War Department Building
on Tuesday, 17 December 1946, at 2:30 P.M.

1. OVER-ALL POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES FOR THE COORDINATION
OF INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL
ESTABLISHMENTS
(C.I.G. 22)

For consideration of the recommendations contained in
C.I.G. 22.

J. S. EARMAN

Acting Secretary, N.I.A.

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COPY NO. 36

I.A.B. 12th Meeting

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 2178
New War Department Building
on Tuesday, 17 December 1946, at 2:30 P.M.

Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of
Central Intelligence, in the Chair

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State for Research and In-
telligence
Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director
of Intelligence, WDGS
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval
Intelligence
Brig. General John A. Samford, Deputy Assistant
Chief of Air Staff-2

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. A. Sidney Buford, Department of State
Colonel E. J. Treacy, U.S.A.
Captain R. K. Davis, U.S.N.
Colonel James F. Briggs, Central Intelligence Group
Colonel Wm. M. Adams, Central Intelligence Group

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Mr. J. S. Earman, Acting Secretary, M.I.A.

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1. COORDINATION OF COLLECTION ACTIVITIES
(C.I.G. 18/3)

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that he understood that there was some confusion as to why C.I.G. 18/3, as circulated, only includes the texts of the proposed N.I.A. Directive and omits the proposed text of the C.I.G. Directive. He stated that C.I.G. 18/2, as circulated on November 21, included both a proposed N.I.A. Directive and a proposed C.I.G. Directive, but the transmitting letter carefully specified that I.A.B. approval was requested only for the N.I.A. Directive. Therefore, in consideration of the State Department's urgent request for early consideration of the N.I.A. Directive, it was circulated in C.I.G. 18/3 with the amendments proposed by the I.A.B. ad hoc committee. He said that at the same time the completed draft of the C.I.G. Directive was circulated to the ad hoc committee members since there had not been time to present this cleaned up text to them; however, the ad hoc committee had approved this text in pencil form at its last meeting. General Vandenberg pointed out that C.I.G. 18/**3** has only minor changes from C.I.G. 18/2 in the N.I.A. Directive section and that at the last I.A.B. meeting general approval of the N.I.A. Directive had been given and no specific requests for changes therein had been made. He said that he believed that the I.A.B. would be able to approve without extensive discussion the text as presented in C.I.G. 18/3, particularly since his proposals for implementation, as contained in the ad hoc committee's final draft, include all suggestions made by the agencies' ad hoc representatives and were concurred in by them at their final meeting. General Vandenberg recommended that in paragraph 1 c of the proposed N.I.A. Directive the words "unproductive duplication and uncoordinated overlap shall be discontinued so . . ." be allowed to remain.

MR. EDDY stated that he would like to recommend that paragraphs 2 a and c of the proposed C.I.G. implementing Directive should be included in the proposed N.I.A. Directive since paragraph 2 a included allocations by subject and

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paragraph 2 g reserved the right of every agency to repeat even on secondary interest to its own agency anything it desired.

GENERAL VANDENBERG then asked how A-2 and O.N.I. felt about the State Department's recommendation as indicated above.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that after some discussion in the Intelligence Division, WDCS, they were not sure whether the meaning of paragraph 2 g of the proposed C.I.G. Directive was understood. He went on to state that all G-2 reports were submitted on duplicating pads and questioned whether or not G-2's representatives in the field should merely pass over to the proper agency at the post or the Embassy whatever information they might have.

MR. EDDY then stated that this was his understanding.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that he would object to any interpretation to indicate that, for example, the State Department's representative report directly to him or his representative (General Chamberlin's) report directly to the State Department.

MR. EDDY then stated that those reports would be passed on to the representatives in the field and a copy sent to the State Department.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN then said that he would like to indicate that all the information passed in from the field, except radiographic forms, from the MA's come on a duplicating pad and not as copies.

GENERAL VANDENBERG then stated that there was no intention to have any such interpretation as indicated by General Chamberlin.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that he had no desire to make any change in the paragraph but that he wanted to be sure that somebody would not object to the Intelligence Division following its usual procedures of sending the duplicating pad to the Intelligence Division in Washington since the information contained therein was given immediately to the agency concerned.

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MR. EDDY then stated that in this paragraph they wanted the men in the field who came across intelligence not of primary interest to them, but of secondary interest, to pass that information to the field representative of the agency primarily concerned. Nothing, however, should prevent a representative from reporting to his own department chief for staff purposes.

GENERAL VANDENBERG then stated that what Mr. Eddy had just said was the principle that was being enunciated in the directives and he would be the first to protest if the agencies were to stop sending information that was not of primary interest to them to C.I.G.

ADMIRAL INGLIS then stated that to clarify this paragraph we should be rather careful of the wording.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN then stated that he had this comment to make after reading these directives - The C.I.G. and N.I.A. Directives uniformly violate the basic principle that in assigning a task, the task should be described in sufficiently clear language for an agency to understand. The agency should be permitted to instruct its subordinates in its own language and that he did not propose to send a C.I.G. Directive to his own people.

GENERAL VANDENBERG then stated that the implementation of C.I.G. Directives by the agencies concerned was "their own business."

ADMIRAL INGLIS then suggested the following change in the language of the paragraph in question: "That we delete the word 'directly' in the second line of sub-paragraph c and insert in the third line before the word 'representative' the word 'field' and then in the last line instead of 'copies' insert 'information to.' It would then read: 'Intelligence information and material regardless of the collector, shall wherever possible be transmitted to the agency most concerned through the field representative of that agency. However, the collector may also send information to his own agency.'"

MR. EDDY stated that he did not believe that he could approve the rewording of paragraph 2 c, as indicated by Admiral Inglis.

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GENERAL CHAMBERLIN then stated that the Intelligence Division distributed to no one outside of the War Department unless a request was received through the Reading Panel and that no automatic distribution was made to the State Department's representative on the Reading Panel unless he (State Department's representative) requested it.

MR. EDDY then stated that he thought the purpose was to get information to the agency primarily concerned and most interested.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN then stated "providing the agency is interested."

MR. EDDY then went on to state that he would not expect reports on military and naval matters to appear in the State Department's Reading Panel which had been collected by a Vice-Consul where there was no military or naval representative present. Mr. Eddy further stated that he concurred in that a report prepared by military or naval personnel should have dissemination made in Washington; however, that political intelligence should be screened by the State Department, and military and air intelligence, for example, should be passed to the man in the field who represented that service. When such reports come to the Department's Reading Panel concerned that Department can then send these reports wherever they may deem necessary. The reporting officer's obligation is then the same as formerly - "He sends a copy of his information to his own agency."

GENERAL SAMFORD then asked whether the use of the word "copy" meant it was identified by being outside the agency's primary field.

MR. EDDY stated that before, when the State Department had an opportunity to get naval information, the Vice-Consul would send that information to the naval attache, since he (the Vice-Consul) couldn't interpret it and there would be confusion if they were to send it to the State Department.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that that was the very reason why he had recommended the re-wording of paragraph 2 c in order to avoid describing how a copy of a report was to be sent to G-2 or O.N.I.

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MR. EDDY stated that in Washington it is recognized as a report that is to be produced or distributed and be available in the department of primary interest.

ADMIRAL INGLIS then stated that he supposed that this fact would be written across the face of the report; that it was a naval subject, and that the Military Attache, for example, had picked it up and given the information to the Naval Attache. Admiral Inglis went on to state that the Military Attache could, for example, write across the face of the report "I have given this information to the Naval Attache."

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that he did not want to change his system since his people were accustomed to put in reports on duplicating pads and as these reports came in they were placed on a mimeograph machine and the number of copies indicated by the Reading Panel were run off. Thus copies are available for State, Navy, A-2 and C.I.G.

MR. EDDY then stated that he foresaw difficulties in the future if the State Department, for example, disseminated widely and also had Reading Panels and disseminated reports from military and naval observers, and some dissemination was made the other way around. Mr. Eddy went on to state that he felt that distribution of reports should be made by the Department having primary interest.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN then stated that there could be very easily inserted a statement in the report which would indicate to whom the report had been submitted.

MR. EDDY suggested that paragraph 2 c could possibly read "... field representatives of the agency most concerned. However, the collector may send copies to his own agency."

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that he did not object to that wording. However, he wanted to be sure that everyone knew of the kind of copy used by the Intelligence Division, namely, a repeating pad. He went on to state that the Intelligence Division made distribution within its own agency and that they could attempt to keep from distributing to other agencies unless such agencies' representatives on the Reading Panel insisted on having the information.

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MR. EDDY questioned whether or not there were "other people" on the Reading Panel.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that the only agencies outside of the War Department having representatives on the Intelligence Division Reading Panel were the State and Navy Departments, and occasionally C.I.G.

MR. EDDY then suggested that paragraph 2 c of the proposed C.I.G. Directive read: "Intelligence information material regardless of the collector shall wherever possible be transmitted immediately to the field representative of the agency most concerned. However, the collector may send copies to his own agency."

MR. EDDY then distributed a proposed change in the wording of the first page of the proposed N.I.A. Directive. Mr. Eddy, after some discussion of this proposal, stated that political and economic intelligence had been bracketed in the State Department for a number of years. Furthermore, modern economics are no more political, as related to political, that we used to study in school. It now pertains to industrial establishments, in addition to protection for most of our American trade. The State Department is quite prepared to have economic intelligence not allocated, but recognized as a vital interest.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that this was difficult for him to go along with and that he could say frankly that he thought it was splitting a field that should never be split. He went on to say that the field of intelligence covered not only collection but also production of intelligence, and it was his feeling and had been all along that the Intelligence Advisory Board should get down to the fundamental principles and solve the overall responsibilities for these departments for the whole intelligence field, as suggested at the last meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board. General Chamberlin then said that apparently the Intelligence Advisory Board was not in complete agreement along these lines so he was willing to go along with this splitting of the collection field,

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before the Intelligence Advisory Board tackled the fundamental principles since he thought that this, perhaps, was a forward step.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that he agreed with the ultimate objective as stated by General Chamberlin and that this was a forward step. He went on to say that the Intelligence Advisory Board was going to have to cooperate and bite this problem off piece by piece. General Vandenberg further said that there are many things that the Intelligence Advisory Board can not now agree upon. However, there were some things on which there could be agreement by one or two of the members giving room.

GENERAL SAMFORD stated that he thought it would be better to keep the allocation by subject, which was a step forward, in the proposed C.I.G. Directive, instead of placing it in the proposed N.I.A. Directive.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that he agreed with General Samford's statement, but if, as we go along, we find that we need something else done, amendments could be made. Further, that he would rather make amendments than make the original directives too broad.

MR. EDDY stated that he wished to propose that paragraph 1 b of the proposed N.I.A. Directive be changed to read as follows: "The American Ambassador or Minister, or the ranking U. S. Foreign Service Officer of each Diplomatic Mission or Foreign Service Post shall be responsible for insuring proper implementation of a coordinated collection program in that area. In areas where a U. S. Commander has the predominant responsibility, he is the Senior U. S. Representative responsible for insuring proper implementation of a coordinated collection program in that area."

CAPTAIN DAVIS then stated that the Navy had a comment to make. The 7th Fleet, for instance, operates outside the governing principles of this entirely. That thought was inter-checked in C.I.G. 18/2 and was in line as recommended. He asked if something similar to the following could not be put back - "Where foreign service establishments and a senior U. S. military commander both have jurisdiction in an area, each will

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be responsible for the activities of the personnel under his administrative control."

GENERAL VANDENBERG then stated that this could be accomplished by the agencies writing their people their understanding of this Directive in the areas in question. He suggested that instructions by the home offices of the agencies be coordinated with ICAPS and the representatives of the agencies in order that the instructions be written in unison. General Vandenberg went on to say that this coordination could well be centered in ICAPS since that was where the agencies and C.I.G. come together.

MR. EDDY suggested that there would be another sentence added to paragraph 1 b of the proposed N.I.A. Directive to read as follows: "This does not apply to the intelligence personnel directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or Theatre Commanders."

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that he was somewhat confused about the words "Senior U. S. representative" and said that he was perfectly agreeable to using the words "Senior Diplomatic representative."

GENERAL VANDENBERG then suggested that paragraph 1 b of the proposed N.I.A. Directive read as follows: "The senior U. S. representative in each foreign area where the United States maintains a foreign service mission shall be responsible for the coordination of all collection activities within his area, and for the proper implementation of the requirements and responsibilities of the respective agencies."

MR. EDDY stated that "If you don't care about any recognition in the occupied areas, I don't differ from that."

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that it was up to the agencies to send out the proper instructions. However, he recommended that in any border line cases that the Intelligence Advisory Board get together on such cases before the instructions were sent to the field.

MR. EDDY then stated that this recommendation was all right with the State Department.

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CAPTAIN DAVIS stated that the Navy would like to have it in the minutes that this would not specifically apply to the operating forces.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN suggested that paragraph 1 b of the proposed N.I.A. Directive be changed to read as follows: "For the coordination of all collection activities in his area within the spirit of the principles enunciated herein." He further stated that he believed that it was a mistake to charge the Ambassadors with the implementation of someone else's directive and authorize them in the line of command of that particular department since the Ambassadors were charged with coordination.

MR. EDDY said that he felt that General Chamberlin's restriction should be in the heading and not in any one subparagraph since it applies only to the limits of this Directive within the limits of principle.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that he would hesitate to give the Ambassadors authority to do anything they might desire. He further stated that his statement above was binding on them (the Ambassadors) since the Ambassadors should coordinate collection of intelligence in accordance with the agreement reached by the Intelligence Advisory Board.

GENERAL VANDENBERG repeated his suggestion that paragraph 1 b of the proposed N.I.A. Directive read as previously indicated.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN then stated that he wanted it very definitely understood that his agreement with this paragraph confines the responsibility of the implementation of the coordination measures, not the implementation of the intelligence collection.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that he thought that General Chamberlin's understanding had to be accepted since he (General Chamberlin) had certain responsibilities as does the Chief of Naval Intelligence.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN then suggested another change that he had in mind which might help to clarify paragraph 1 f of the proposed N.I.A. Directive, which change reads as follows:

"After the words 'transmission to' insert 'respective home

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offices in Washington.' Paragraph 1 f would then read:

' . . . abroad are individually responsible for the collection and for the appropriate transmission to their respective home offices in Washington. . . .'

General Chamberlin further stated that the above change was suggested since he wanted to be sure that Military Attaches would not transmit information direct to the State and Navy Departments here in Washington.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that he did not feel that this change was necessary since the Intelligence Division's instructions to its MA's could prevent any such action.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that the reason he made this point was because it might violate another Directive which was on its way for consideration.

MR. EDDY noted that if General Chamberlin's suggested change above was adopted, it would prevent certain coordination in the field.

After further discussion it was decided to leave paragraph 1 f of the proposed N.I.A. Directive as originally written.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN asked if he was correct in judging that this was authority given by the National Intelligence Authority to the Ambassadors, not the State Department, as the senior representative.

MR. EDDY stated that he thought that it was broader than that and that it was a matter of the President's representative abroad.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN then stated that he just wanted to be sure that it was authority given to the Ambassadors in view of their position.

MR. EDDY went on to state that the Ambassador's Charge d'Affaires represented him just as a Deputy Commander and that the Charge d'Affaires had all the Ambassador's authority in his absence.

CAPTAIN DAVIS then stated that he wanted to indicate in the minutes that as far as the Army and Navy are concerned that the allocations contained in the proposed N.I.A. Directive were

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a little broad and that he would like to bring forth allocations made in a joint letter between the Army and Navy in August, 1945. Captain Davis asked whether or not these allocations would still in fact be in effect.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that the allocations had purposely been left broad.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that he thought that the agreement mentioned by Captain Davis would still stand.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that he could not say that this agreement was still in effect and that it was between the Army and Navy. General Vandenberg commented -- "I can not agree or disagree."

The Intelligence Advisory Board adjourned without approving C.I.G. 18/3.

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NOTE:

Subsequently, the Intelligence Advisory Board, by voting slip, approved C.I.G. 18/3, (which has been published as N.I.A. Directive No. 7) with the following changes:

Paragraph 2 c of the proposed C.I.G. Directive to read "Intelligence information and material regardless of the collector shall, wherever possible, be transmitted immediately to the field representative of the agency most concerned. However, the collector may also send copies to his own agency." inserted as paragraph 1 b of N.I.A. Directive No. 7.

Insertion of sub-paragraphs 2 a and c, as amended, of the proposed C.I.G. Directive into N.I.A. Directive No. 7 as paragraph 1 a and b, respectively.

Paragraph 1 b of the proposed N.I.A. Directive to read as follows: "The senior U. S. representative in each foreign area where the United States maintains a foreign service post shall be responsible for the coordination of all collection activities in his area and the proper implementation of that coordination within the spirit of the principles enunciated herein." inserted in N.I.A. Directive No. 7 as paragraph 1 c.

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Paragraph 1 c of the proposed N.I.A. Directive was amended as follows: "In order to avoid unproductive duplication and uncoordinated overlap all collection facilities will be utilized to their maximum within budgetary limitations for the production of that full flow of intelligence material which is the major need of all departments." and inserted in N.I.A. Directive No. 7 as paragraph 1 d.

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I.A.B. 13th Meeting

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in Room 7117
North Interior Building
(18th and F Streets N.W.)
on Thursday, 15 May 1947 at 2:30 P. M.

1. COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION
(I.A.B. #1)

For consideration of the recommendations contained in the report of the ad hoc committee appointed to draft a proposed N.I.A. Directive on "The Coordination of Intelligence Production."

2. ACTION BY THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD ON MATTERS
SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY
(C.I.G. 24)

For consideration of the recommendations contained in C.I.G. 24.

3. AMENDMENT OF THE DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC AND
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
(I.A.B. #2)

For consideration of the recommendations contained in I.A.B. #2.

J. S. FARMAN

Acting Secretary, N.I.A.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 7117
North Interior Building
On Thursday, 15 May 1947, at 2:30 P.M.

Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, Director
of Central Intelligence, in the Chair

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State for Research and
Intelligence
Maj. General George C. McDonald, Assistant
Chief of Air Staff-2
Brig. General Walter E. Todd, Deputy Director
of Intelligence, W.D.G.S.
Capt. Abel C. Sabalot, Acting Chief of
Intelligence, O.N.I.

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. Donald Edgar, Central Intelligence Group
Mr. Park Armstrong, Department of State
Colonel Riley F. Ennis, U.S.A.
Capt. R. K. Davis, U.S.N.
Colonel E. J. Treacy, U.S.A.
Licut. Colonel Frank B. Chappell, U.S.A.
Major W. C. Baird, U.S.A.

SECRETARIAT

Mr. J. S. Earman, Secretary, N.I.A.

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1. LETTER OF APPRECIATION TO LIEUT. GENERAL HOYT S. VANDENBURG

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE brought to the attention of the Board a proposed letter of IAB appreciation to General Vandenberg submitted by the Chief of Naval Intelligence. The letter was signed by Mr. Eddy and General McDonald and given to Captain Davis to secure the signature of Admiral Inglis. The letter will then be returned to the Secretary, N.I.A., who will secure the signature of General Chamberlin upon his return to Washington, after which it will be forwarded to General Vandenberg.

2. COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION
(I.A.B. #1)

THE DIRECTOR stated if there were no comments on paragraphs 2 a (1) and (2) of the proposed N.I.A. Directive on the "Coordination of Intelligence Production," he wished to recommend that paragraph 2 a (3) be amended to read as follows: "When completed as provided for above, this outline and initial allocations of production and maintenance responsibilities shall be issued in the name of the N.I.A. by the Director of Central Intelligence as an implementation of this Directive. It is expected . . ." (The remainder of the paragraph to read as presently written.)

COLONEL ENNIS noted that General Chamberlin was extremely concerned about the exact wording of this paragraph since he felt that its contents were the backbone of the allocation of personnel, the organization of various agencies for production, and, therefore, that the outline of basic intelligence and initial allocations of production and maintenance responsibilities should be approved on the highest level and that he, General Chamberlin, was particularly anxious to have the phraseology "submitted for N.I.A. approval" included in the paragraph.

After considerable discussion where it was noted by Captain Sabalot that the outline of all basic intelligence and tentative allocations of production and maintenance responsibilities should be submitted for N.I.A. approval rather than issued in the name of

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the N.I.A. by the Director of Central Intelligence,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Agreed to amend paragraph 2 a (3) to read as follows: "When completed this outline and tentative allocations of production and maintenance responsibilities shall be submitted for N.I.A. approval and issued as an implementation of this Directive. It is expected . . ." (The remainder of the paragraph to read as presently written.)

THE DIRECTOR stated he wished to recommend that the last sentence of paragraph 2 a (4) be amended to read as follows: "The National Intelligence Surveys will be distributed in such form as shall be determined by the Director of Central Intelligence and the agencies concerned."

After some discussion, where it was noted by Major Baird that a proposed outline of National Intelligence Surveys was now being circulated to the agencies for approval,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Agreed to amend the last sentence of paragraph 2 a (4) as recommended by the Director, with the exception that the word "distributed" be changed to "disseminated."

THE DIRECTOR then recommended the word "sometimes" be placed between the words "them" and "without" in paragraph 2 b (1). After some discussion,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Agreed to insert the word "usually" between the words "them" and "without" in paragraph 2 b (1).

THE DIRECTOR stated he wished to recommend that paragraph 2 b (3) be amended to read as follows: "Interagency dissemination of current intelligence shall be subject to the overall planning and coordination of the Director of Central Intelligence and shall be based on stated requirements of the agencies and upon their known missions and dominant interest." After discussion

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where Mr. Eddy stated that the Department of State preferred that this paragraph be left unchanged, and Captain Davis stated that ONI has always held the view that dissemination of current intelligence had been going satisfactorily so far, and further, to centralize dissemination in this case when there are so few agencies involved was needless,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Agreed that paragraph 2 b (3) should stand as written.

THE DIRECTOR stated that the words "production capabilities" had unwittingly crept into the wording of paragraph 2 c (2). He recommended that these words be omitted and the word "or" be added after the word "responsibility."

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Approved the deletion of the words "production capabilities" and the addition of the word "or" between the words "responsibility" and "recognition."

THE DIRECTOR recommended that the word "intelligence" be added between the words "Any" and "agency" in paragraph 2 c (3).

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Approved this recommendation without discussion.

THE DIRECTOR then stated A-2 had recommended that paragraph 2 c (4) be amended to read as follows: "For the purposes of paragraph (3) above, the following division of interests, subject to refinement through a continuous program of coordination by the Director of Central Intelligence, shall serve as a general delineation of dominant interests.

Political, Cultural, Sociological Intelligence	State Department
Military Intelligence	War Department
Naval Intelligence	Navy Department
Air Intelligence	Army Air Forces
Economic and Scientific Intelligence	Each agency in accordance with its respective needs"

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After some discussion, where it was pointed out by Captain Davis that ONI was willing to agree to the amendment of this paragraph as proposed by A-2, with the suggestion that consideration be given to placing this paragraph as a new general paragraph 4, and rewording of the first line to read as follows: "For the purposes of intelligence production the following division . . ."

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Approved the changes as recommended by A-2, together with the additional change suggested by Captain Davis in paragraph 2 c 4.

GENERAL TODD then stated that paragraph 2 d (2) had previously read, when discussed by the Ad Hoc Committee: "The Director of Central Intelligence shall produce and disseminate national intelligence." After some discussion

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Agreed to amend paragraph 2 d (2) to read as indicated by General Todd.

THE DIRECTOR stated he wished to recommend that one of the following revisions of paragraph 2 d (3) be approved by the Intelligence Advisory Board:

a. "The Director of Central Intelligence shall with the advice of the IAB agencies plan and develop the production of national intelligence with due regard to the production capabilities and dominant interests of the Intelligence Advisory Board and other departmental intelligence agencies concerned."

b. "The Director of Central Intelligence shall plan and develop the production of national intelligence in coordination with the IAB agencies in order that he may obtain from them, within the limits of their capabilities, the departmental intelligence which will assist him in the production of national intelligence."

After some discussion, THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Agreed to adopt the revision of paragraph 2 d (3) as indicated in b above.

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~~53394~~CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPCORRECTION TO MINUTES OF THE 13TH I.A.B. MEETINGMemorandum by the SecretaryMAY - 5 1947
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1. Paragraph 3, page 6, of the minutes of the 13th I.A.B. meeting, 15 May 1947, erroneously indicate that the I.A.B. at that meeting agreed to amend paragraph 2 d (4) of the proposed N.I.A. Directive on "Coordination of Intelligence Production" to read:

"The Director of Central Intelligence shall by agreement with the pertinent agency or agencies in their fields of dominant interest or in accordance with their production capabilities as may be necessary in the production of intelligence reports or estimates undertaken mutually."

WHEREAS

This amendment should have read:

"The Director of Central Intelligence shall by agreement with the pertinent agency or agencies request and receive such special estimates, reports, and periodic briefs or summaries prepared by the individual departments or agencies in their fields of dominant interest or in accordance with their production capabilities as may be necessary in the production of intelligence reports or estimates undertaken mutually."

2. It is, therefore, requested that the enclosed corrected page 6 be substituted for the one now included in the above-mentioned minutes and the superseded page destroyed by burning.

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3. It is further requested that the abbreviation "JANIS" appearing in the 9th line on page 7 of subject minutes be changed to the abbreviation "NIS."

J. S. EARMAN

Secretary, N.I.A.

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CORRECTION TO
IAB 13TH MINUTES

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THE DIRECTOR stated he also wished to recommend that paragraph 2 d (4) be amended to read as follows: "The Director of Central Intelligence shall by agreement with the pertinent agency or agencies request and receive such special estimates, reports and periodic briefs or summaries to be prepared by the individual departments or agencies in their fields of dominant interest or in accordance with their production capabilities as may be necessary in the production of intelligence reports or estimates undertaken mutually or by the direction of the President or the National Intelligence Authority."

After considerable discussion, where it was brought out that estimates, reports, and periodic briefs or summaries prepared by the individual departments or agencies in their fields of dominant interest or in accordance with their production capabilities were considered to be those prepared in the past, present and future,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Agreed to amend paragraph 2 d (4) to read as follows:

"The Director of Central Intelligence shall by agreement with the pertinent agency or agencies request and receive such special estimates, reports, and periodic briefs or summaries prepared by the individual departments or agencies in their fields of dominant interest or in accordance with their production capabilities as may be necessary in the production of intelligence reports or estimates undertaken mutually."

THE DIRECTOR suggested and

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Agreed that the word "sufficient" in the second and fifth lines of general paragraph 3 be changed to "adequate."

CAPTAIN DAVIS stated that ONI felt that before this Directive is issued by the National Intelligence Authority, it should go to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a request that they consent to merge the JANIS program with NIS, and further that the Director of Central Intelligence request the Director of Intelligence, W.D.G.S., to consent to merge SID with NIS.

THE DIRECTOR stated it was his understanding that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were preparing a paper recommending that JANIS be

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(Corrected)

merged with NIS. However, in the event such a paper did not materialize, it was his desire that the proposed N.I.A. Directive on the "Coordination of Intelligence Production," as amended at this meeting, be forwarded to the National Intelligence Authority recommending that the N.I.A. refer the proposed Directive to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment with reference to the merger of JANIS and NIS, and further that a letter would be prepared to the Director of Intelligence, W.D.G.S., recommending that SID also be merged with ~~JANIS~~^{NIS}.

THE DIRECTOR stated he did not agree altogether with paragraph 6 d of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, particularly that part which stated "with the aid of as many sub-committees as necessary." He went on to say that if G-2 and JIC transferred to the Central Intelligence Group the SID and JANIS programs, he believed that the present IAB Ad Hoc Committee, as an interagency planning board, plus working committees similar to that now operating on the defense project under ORF guidance, would be capable of efficient handling.

CAPTAIN DAVIS stated only one Ad Hoc Committee had been recommended, unless it was necessary to get down to the JISPB, the people who were familiar with the JANIS program. He further stated that no definite number of sub-committees were recommended except as might be necessary to initiate the production of NIS.

COLONEL ENNIS stated that he was in agreement with the Director and that the permanent IAB Committee, if appointed, could invite representatives from the agencies indicated in paragraph 6 d of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee.

After further discussion, THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Agreed that the presently established IAB Ad Hoc Committee would in fact be the committee recommended in paragraph 6 d of the above-mentioned Ad Hoc Committee report and further that representatives of the other agencies would be invited to sit as members as they were needed.

3. ACTION BY THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD ON MATTERS
SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY
(C.I.G. 24 and C.I.G. 24/1)

After some discussion THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Agreed to hold this paper over until the next meeting in order to give the members of the Board an opportunity to study the alternative proposal contained in C.I.G. 24/1.

4. AMENDMENT OF THE DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC AND NATIONAL
POLICY INTELLIGENCE
(I.A.B. #2)

THE DIRECTOR stated that he did not feel it was within his province to recommend to the National Intelligence Authority that that Authority amend the definition of strategic and national policy intelligence after such definition had in fact been approved by the N.I.A.

THE DIRECTOR noted that any member of the Intelligence Advisory Board had a perfect right to appeal direct to his N.I.A. member.

After considerable discussion, where it was noted by Captain Davis that ONI wished to gain the views of the other IAB members on the present definition of strategic and national policy intelligence,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Agreed, in the absence of Admiral Inglis, to postpone further discussion on this paper.

5. EXPLOITATION OF ENEMY DOCUMENT REPOSITORIES
(C.I.G. 21 and C.I.G. 21/1)

THE DIRECTOR stated that in view of the fact that the cost (\$82,950) of carrying out the recommendations contained in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee appointed to explore the document situation was not included in the CIG budget, and further that the budget had not been approved, he wished to recommend that action be deferred on this paper pending approval of the CIG budget.

After some discussion, THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Agreed to defer action on C.I.G. 21/1 as recommended by the Director.

6. REPORT BY MR. EDDY

MR. EDDY informed the IAB in detail of an agreement reached between him and the Director with reference to certain proposed action to be taken as a result of the House Appropriations Committee's recommended cut in the State Department's budget.

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